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1. Understanding savings groups 
Savings groups (SGs) are self-managed, community-based financial institutions 
where self-selected members pool money into a common pool and borrow from 
the pool at an interest (Le Polain, Sterck, & Nyssens, 2018; Burlando & Canidio, 
2017). Referred to as the “small wonder” by the Economist (The Economist, 
2011), the modern savings groups model has its roots in the 1990s. An initiative 
that started in Niger by the Cooperative for Assistance and Relief Everywhere 
(CARE) was driven by the need to achieve socioeconomic empowerment of 
women (Grant & Allen, 2002). Through the Mata Masu Dubara (Women on the 
Move) program, women were organized into groups through which they 
consolidated their own funds from which they would then take loans at an interest. 
This initiative gave birth to the Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA), 
one of the most widely implemented savings group models in existence today 
(Brunie et al., 2017). Based on the VSLA model, several international 
development organizations have built their own models such as the Savings and 
Internal Lending Communities model by Catholic Relief Services, the Saving for 
Change program by Oxfam in collaboration with Freedom from Hunger and the 
Stromme Foundation, the Women Organizing Resources Together (WORTH) 
program by Pact, the Agha Khan model, the Savings for Transformation by World 
Vision program, and more.  
SGs are mobilized by development organizations referred to as facilitating 
agencies and these agencies find SGs appealing because they offer a sustainable 
way to assure a basic model for financial inclusion (Le Polain et al., 2018) and a 
platform for delivery of other development programs (e.g., gender training, 
business training, health education, etc.) to hard-to-reach rural populations 
particularly in Africa (Sinclair & Singh, 2015). The growing popularity of SGs is 
reflected in current estimates that show that there are over 14 million members in 
facilitated SGs1 controlling assets between 430 million and 1.2 billion US dollars 
(SEEP Network, 2016).  
 
1This number pertains to SGs supported by facilitating agencies. However, the estimate is much higher if 




The SG methodology is based on centuries’ old traditional financial systems, often 
referred to as Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and 
Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) (Beaman, Karlan, & 
Thuysbaert, 2014). In ROSCAs, people routinely gather in groups where funds are 
collected in a common pool and handed over to one person in turn until all the 
group members have had their turn, after which the group is disbanded or a new 
cycle starts (Gugerty, 2007; Van den Brink & Chavas, 1997). In ASCAs, funds are 
collected in a common pool at regular meetings just like in the ROSCAs. However, 
rather than give all the collected funds to each person in turn, the funds are allowed 
to accumulate, and group members can take loans from the common pool at an 
interest (Bouman, 1995). At the end of a cycle, the accumulated funds are then 
shared out among the group members. Savings groups especially build on the 
ASCA model since SG members make contributions to a common fund from 
which they can take a loan at an interest. However, unlike ASCAs that emerge 
spontaneously based on local initiatives, savings groups are facilitated by an 
external agency, usually an international non-government organization (NGO) 
such as Oxfam, CARE International, World Vision, etc. (Ledgerwood, Earne, & 
Nelson, 2013). These organizations mobilize community members into groups and 
train the members in a predefined SG methodology for saving and borrowing that 
is aimed at assuring transparency and sustainability. Hence, the facilitating 
agencies (the NGOs) aim to introduce procedures that will enhance the operation 
of the SGs.  
Once training in the SG methodology is completed, members organize themselves 
into groups typically composed of 20–30 members and elect their leaders 
(Burlando & Canidio, 2017). At this point, the facilitating agency takes on a 
monitoring role until the group is deemed mature enough to continue operations 
on its own without the support of the agency. SGs operate in cycles and a typical 
cycle lasts one year. Before the start of a cycle, groups formulate a constitution 
that lays down agreed upon guidelines pertaining to the day-to-day functioning of 
the group. Such guidelines include the maximum number of members allowed in 
the group, the minimum amount that one can save, which is often referred to as a 
“share,” the interest rate to be charged on loans, the frequency of meetings and 
 
is a multiplier effect that sees more groups formed without the support of the agency (Karlan et al., 2017). 
In Uganda, for example, Mine et al. (2013) find that for every SG that is formed by a facilitating agency, 




related fines for missing the scheduled meetings, and the group leadership structure 
and related procedures for electing leaders. 
When a cycle begins, members invest savings into the group by purchasing shares. 
Usually, there is a maximum limit to how many shares a member can purchase at 
every meeting. This is to ensure that members of a group are sufficiently 
homogeneous. The group funds are kept in a lockbox that normally has three 
different locks, and the keys are kept by different group members for safety 
purposes. The lockbox is opened only during the group meetings in the presence 
of group members. When funds accumulate, members take loans at an interest. 
Loan requests are subject to approval by other group members and, usually, a 
member can take a loan that is up to 3 times their savings amount. All saving and 
borrowing activities take place during the scheduled group meetings. 
For bookkeeping purposes, every member has a passbook in which their saving 
and borrowing transactions are recorded. On the group level, a general ledger is 
kept recording the total amount in the cash box. This is updated by the treasurer at 
every group meeting. In addition to the group loan fund, some groups keep a 
welfare fund that is used in case of emergencies like death of a family member, 
natural calamity, etc. Hence, the welfare fund acts as an informal insurance 
mechanism. At the end of the cycle, all the cash in the loan fund, i.e., member 
savings and interest earned on loans, is shared out among the group members in 
proportion to each member’s savings amount. This acts as an audit and, at this 
point, groups can make changes to the group’s guidelines and composition before 
a new cycle starts. 
Owing to its flexibility, its ability to reach largely excluded populations, and the 
minimum costs required for its implementation, the savings group model has 
undergone many developments and innovations. Some of these developments that 
are touched on in this thesis include linking SGs to formal financial institutions, 
using SGs to deliver other development initiatives, and engaging men in SGs. 
Because SGs are intended to be autonomous, some of these developments, like 
linking SGs to formal financial institutions, may influence the group’s financial 
operations. Moreover, using SGs to deliver other development initiatives raises 
questions as to whether this would not divert the groups from their core saving and 




members may have an effect on the way men and women interact in groups. 
Drawing on these innovations, this thesis aims to shed light on the performance of 
savings groups. Specifically, we delve into the following research questions: How 
do linkages with formal financial institutions influence the performance of savings 
groups? How does financial education delivered through savings groups influence 
the performance of these groups? What impact does male membership have on 
savings groups’ profit-generating capacity? Before elaborating on these questions 
in Section 4, I first discuss performance measures for SGs in Section 2. Then, I 
describe the dataset used in this dissertation and the issues that arise when 
attempting to make causal inferences from observational data in Section 3. 
2. Core SG performance measures 
Savings groups are usually designed in such a way that they do not require external 
capital and are entirely dependent on savings from the group members (Jeffrey, 
2009). Consequently, savings per member is our first performance measure for this 
financial model. Savings are the main input of the SG methodology and they make 
it possible to collect a lump sum that can be made available as loans to interested 
members. Savings per member is calculated as the value of members’ savings 
divided by the number of members in the group. This measure can be scaled by 
the gross national income (GNI) per capita for comparability across countries with 
different macroeconomic environments. 
How do members then benefit from investing their savings into the group? Mainly, 
member savings are made available as loans to interested group members at 
interest. It is optimal that a larger percentage of the savings are converted into loans 
as funds left in the lockbox do not earn returns for the members. Consequently, 
fund utilization rate is our second performance measure. It captures the rate and 
efficiency with which members’ savings are converted into loans and is calculated 
as the value of loans outstanding divided by the value of members’ savings. 
Our third measurement, return on savings, captures the group’s profitability and 
the wealth created for group members. It is calculated as the profits generated at a 
point in time divided by the average value of members’ savings at the same point 
in time and measures how the group uses members’ savings to generate profit for 




savings plus earned interest) are shared out among the group members in 
proportion to each member’s savings.  
3. Causal inference with observational data 
To investigate the different research questions, we use data from the Savings 
Group Information Exchange (SAVIX).2 The SAVIX is an online platform that 
contains standardized data on over 200,000 savings groups globally. It is the first 
platform to provide data on different metrics related to a vast number of savings 
groups. The metrics cover group gender composition, country of origin, location 
(i.e., rural versus urban), different variables like savings, value and number of 
loans outstanding etc. It was developed by VSL Associates3 in collaboration with 
three facilitating agencies including CARE, Oxfam, and Catholic Relief Services 
and funding from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation. Data is collected by field 
officers who work on behalf of the facilitating agencies and it is uploaded to an 
online Management Information System on a quarterly basis.  
The SAVIX database contains observational data, i.e., the data is generated in an 
uncontrolled setting (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005). A major source of bias arising 
from such data is the non-random assignment of units to the treatment or control 
group. Random assignment aims to create two groups that are comparable along 
both observed and unobserved characteristics before an intervention is 
implemented (White & Raitzer, 2017). This makes causal claims possible as 
assignment to the treatment or control group is independent of the characteristics 
prior to the intervention. In the absence of randomization as is usually the case 
with observational data, endogeneity concerns, especially of selection bias, are 
commonplace (Rosenbaum, 2005). 
“Selection bias arises when the treatment variable is correlated with the error in 
the outcome equation” (Cameron & Trivedi, 2005, p. 868). In such a situation, 
assignment to either the treatment or control group is based on certain existing 
characteristics and, hence, there are systematic differences between the two groups 








of an intervention on outcomes of interest may be problematic as the results may 
reflect the characteristics before the intervention rather than as an effect of the 
intervention itself. In Chapter 1, for example, savings groups are assessed along 
certain group-specific characteristics based on the linkage-readiness assessment 
tool developed by CARE International. This means that even before linkage, there 
are already systematic differences between savings groups that are linked to formal 
financial institutions and those that are not. Hence, a general regression approach 
based on pooled observational data will give biased estimates for the influence of 
linkages on outcomes of interest unless adjustments are made for the selection bias.  
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are designed to minimize such biases. 
However, these are not always feasible due to cost and time constraints (White, 
2013). Additionally, RCTs face external validity limitations as the results may not 
be generalizable to the general population (Williams, 2020). Another problem 
observed in many RCTs is that groups that are elected for treatment are often not 
interested in being treated and this may result in low participation (White, 2013); 
i.e., one can end up with “treated” groups that are not treated at all but only selected 
for being treated. In addition to RCTs, several statistical methodologies for 
mitigating selection bias under various assumptions have been proposed, e.g., 
matching, difference-in-differences (DID), regression discontinuity design, 
instrumental variables, etc. In this thesis, we apply matching and DID, depending 
on the available data. 
Matching is one of the most widely applied methods for dealing with selection 
bias. Matching estimators aim to select treated groups (those that receive an 
intervention) and control groups (those that do not receive an intervention) that are 
similar along observable characteristics (Dehejia & Wahba, 2002) except for the 
fact that one received treatment and the other did not. Whatever effect is found 
from comparing a matched sample can then be attributed to the treatment. 
Matching is usually feasible when there is a large control sample (Rosenbaum, 
2002). Matching estimators can be based on covariates as in mahalanobis distance 
matching or based on the probability of receiving treatment as in propensity score 
matching (Imbens, 2004). In Chapter 1, using the linkage-readiness assessment 
tool, we employ matching estimators to make the savings groups that are linked to 




Chapter 2, we match groups that receive financial education with those that do not 
receive it along several covariates. 
Another proposed solution for mitigating selection bias is the difference-in-
differences methodology. This is applicable when one has data on the treated and 
control groups both before and after the intervention (Listl, Jürges, & Watt, 2016). 
Under the parallel-trend assumption, one can determine the effect of an 
intervention by comparing how the outcome changes in the treated and control 
groups before and after the intervention (Bertrand, Duflo, & Mullainathan, 2004). 
The DID methodology takes into consideration time-invariant unobservable 
variables (Zhou at al., 2016). Following data pre-processing with matching 
estimators, we apply difference-in-differences methods in Chapters 1 and 3, where 
we have data on the treated and control groups before and after the intervention. 
4. Overview of chapters 
This thesis consists of three chapters that each address a different factor that 
influences the performance of SGs. Chapter 1 looks at SGs’ financial linkages with 
formal financial institutions. Chapter 2 looks at financial education delivered 
through savings groups. Chapter 3 looks at SGs’ gender composition. 
Chapter 1 investigates the effect of financial linkages on the performance of 
savings groups. Financial linkages occur when informal savings groups either open 
a joint savings account at a formal financial institution or participate in a joint 
credit facility arrangement with a formal financial institution. The central reason 
for financial linkages between savings groups and formal financial institutions is 
to balance group liquidity shortages and excesses. Additionally, financial linkage 
is attractive as it is viewed as a conduit for formal financial inclusion. Applying a 
difference-in-differences methodology to a matched sample of data on 3,234 
savings groups from 31 countries, we investigate the differential effect of a savings 
and credit linkage. This is complemented with a qualitative investigation from SGs 
in Uganda that provides more insight into the observed results obtained from the 
quantitative investigation. Overall, there is a positive effect of savings linkage on 
savings per member and return on savings. We argue that this is due to the 
safekeeping function that an account with a formal financial institution provides. 




linkage, probably because the cash is no longer readily at hand in the lockbox but 
is now deposited in a bank that may be geographically located at a distance from 
the group and may also require procedures to withdraw it. By contrast, there is a 
negative effect of the credit linkage on savings per member and return on savings. 
This may be because infusion of external capital discourages internal savings 
mobilization. The results suggest that financial linkage should be demand-driven, 
i.e., based on the need of the SG, and savings group facilitators should weigh the 
costs against the benefits before prescribing financial linkages for SGs. 
Chapter 2 takes a critical look at the effectiveness of financial education delivered 
through the informal savings groups. There is widespread recognition that 
traditional classroom-based financial education has fallen short of stimulating 
substantial changes in adult financial behavior (e.g., Carpena, Cole, Shapiro, & 
Zia, 2019). We show that savings groups provide an innovative delivery channel 
for financial education especially at the bottom of the pyramid. Based on a matched 
sample of data on 2,364 savings groups from 9 African countries, our random 
effects regression results show the benefits of financial education both at the 
individual and at the group level. At the individual level, members increase their 
savings as evidenced by the increase in savings per member. At the group level, 
there is an increase in profitability and the rate at which members’ savings are 
converted into loans. This is evidenced by the increased fund utilization rate and 
return on savings for groups that receive financial education. We partly attribute 
this to the fact that savings groups offer members an immediate opportunity and 
framework for putting into practice the new financial knowledge acquired. The 
findings show that knowledge alone may not be enough to change individual 
financial behavior and should be complemented with practical hands-on 
experience as is possible in SGs. 
Chapter 3 delves into the composition of the group in terms of gender and how this 
influences the group’s profit-generating capacity. I start from the premise that, like 
many development efforts, the savings group was initially promoted as a gender-
focused financial initiative with a particular emphasis on women. The first 
facilitated savings group, the Village Savings and Loan Association, was at its 
inception exclusively composed of women. Yet, recent trends suggest that male 
participation and advocacy to engage men as group members are increasing. I 




savings groups and further probe the moderating effect of gender equality in the 
countries where the groups are located. Based on a sample of 81,853 savings 
groups from 30 countries, random effects regression results suggest that male 
membership negatively impacts the profit-generating capacity of savings groups. 
Moreover, gender inequality in a country strengthens the observed relationship. 
These findings highlight the need to thoroughly appraise gender-based 
interventions aimed at the SGs in order to avoid harming some aspects of their core 
operational model. Further, they also show that contextual factors should be 
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Should informal financial groups at the bottom of the 
pyramid be linked to banks? A comparative analysis of linked 
and unlinked groups* 
Abstract 
We investigate the influence that linkages with formal financial institutions have 
on the performance of savings groups. Applying a difference-in-differences 
methodology to a matched sample of data on 3,234 savings groups from 31 
countries, we contribute to the literature by investigating the differential effect 
resulting from a credit linkage and a savings linkage. Overall, results indicate that 
a savings linkage is beneficial to the groups as it enhances group performance in 
terms of increased savings per member and return on savings. There is, however, 
a reduction in the fund utilization rate following a savings linkage. By contrast, a 
credit linkage largely has a negative effect on the performance of the groups as 
observed in a reduction in the savings per member and return on savings following 
the credit linkage. The findings offer guidance for international development 
organizations, policy makers, and banks currently recommending bank linkage to 
savings groups. 
Keywords: Financial Linkages; Savings Groups; Financial Inclusion; Difference-
in-Differences 
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In many developing economies, informal financial institutions continue to serve as 
a vital source of financial services at the bottom of the pyramid. One such informal 
arrangement is savings groups (SGs). SGs are member-owned institutions that are 
comprised of 15–25 self-selected members who pool money in a common fund 
and borrow from the fund at an interest rate (Allen & Panetta, 2010). Informal 
savings groups are increasingly gaining attention as conduits for financial 
inclusion, especially among the excluded poor and rural communities, hence 
buttressing efforts of major global organizations like the World Bank. Given their 
potential, governments are increasing their commitment to savings groups as 
pathways to financial inclusion (Jarden & Rahamatali, 2018). Additionally, a host 
of international development organizations like Plan International, CARE 
International, and the Agha Khan Foundation are promoting SGs as a potential 
solution to multidimensional poverty. Often SGs not only offer their members 
access to basic savings and credit services, but also serve as platforms for 
development organizations to provide other important development services like 
literacy training and training in income-generating activities.  
Despite their relevance and popularity, SGs are usually limited in their capacity to 
fulfill the financial needs of their clientele, for several reasons. First, SGs 
experience seasonal fluctuations in the amount of money available in the loan fund. 
This is because SGs operate on a cycle system that usually lasts a year and group 
activities are planned around this cycle system. As a result, at the beginning of the 
savings cycle, deposits are few and small, and there is insufficient money in the 
loan fund to service the loan needs of the members (Burlando & Canidio, 2017). 
On the other hand, at the end of the savings cycle, there is a surplus of money in 
the loan fund as loans are repaid, and the excess funds in the pot of money available 
for lending pose a security risk for the group. Second, SGs may be unable to 
progressively cover bigger loans. As the SG matures, there may be a demand for 
larger and more long-term loans by the members. Third, SGs are normally 
composed of people who are engaged in similar economic activities that can be 
affected by systemic shocks, e.g., droughts, such that if there is a shock, it will 
compromise the very existence of the group, as almost all the members will be 





Given the above limitations of the SG methodology, there has been a continued 
policy push to link savings groups to formal financial institutions (Cassidy & 
Fafchamps, 2020; Burlando & Canidio, 2017; BFA, 2014). Organizations involved 
in the promotion of SGs are continuously innovating ways of linking savings 
groups to the formal financial system. The central reason for financial linkages 
between SGs and formal financial institutions is to balance SG liquidity shortages 
and excesses as well as boost the pot of money available for lending (Ledgerwood, 
Earne, & Nelson, 2013). During periods when SGs face shortages, additional funds 
can be made available through seeking extra credit from formal financial 
institutions (Ledgerwood & Jethani, 2013). On the other hand, during periods 
when SGs face security risks, excess funds can be deposited in formal financial 
institutions for safekeeping (Bouman, 1977; Chipeta & Mkandawire, 1992; 
Ledgerwood & Jethani, 2013). 
In this paper, we investigate the effect that linkages with a formal financial 
institution have on the performance of savings groups. Several scholars support 
such linkages between formal and informal financial institutions in the view that 
they have the potential to increase the supply of financial services in rural areas 
(Ghate, 1992; Pagura & Kirsten, 2006; Piprek, 2007) by leveraging the strengths 
of both sectors. Informal financial institutions such as SGs may seek to link with 
their formal counterparts to get access to a wider resource base and expertise while 
the formal financial institutions may increase their loan portfolio and at the same 
time tap into the information that the savings groups possess on their members that 
might help the banks to better understand the demands of the clientele (Pagura & 
Kirsten, 2006; Aryeetey, 2008).  
There are, however, several cautionary arguments against financial linkages. 
Based on theoretical reasoning, there are arguments that such linkages will disturb 
the dynamics of savings groups (Dercon, De Weerdt, Bold & Pankhurst, 2006; 
Aliber, 2002) as they have to meet some formal requirements of the formal 
financial institutions. Furthermore, there are concerns that these financial linkages 
risk weakening the social systems that bind members together (Bouman, 1977). 
Moreover, some scholars argue that an infusion of external capital into savings 
groups poses the risk of diverting the group from their savings mobilization 




Understanding the impact that financial linkages have on the savings groups is of 
paramount interest to several actors. After all, SGs represent a major segment of 
the financial system in developing economies, with over 20–30 million members 
(Seel, 2018).4 Further, as of 2016, SGs had between $430 and $1.2 billion in total 
assets (SEEP Network, 2016). Further still, governments in developing countries 
are increasingly advocating policies for linking SGs to formal financial institutions 
in order to increase financial inclusion.5 Consequently, there has been a call for 
scholarly research among practitioners on the impact of these linkages on SGs 
(Nelson & Gash, 2016). Yet, except for a few case studies investigating the linkage 
efforts of particular development agencies (e.g., Maes, 2007; Bakliwal & Umoh, 
2011), comprehensive empirical studies investigating the implications of financial 
linkage on savings groups’ performance are yet to be undertaken. Such is the 
research objective of the present study. 
Using a matched sample of data on 3,234 SGs from 31 countries, this paper is the 
first to carry out a rigorous empirical investigation of the relationship between 
financial linkage and a selection of complementary savings groups’ performance 
dimensions. Our empirical analysis is based on a sample extracted from the 
Savings Group Information Exchange (SAVIX), a global dataset that collects 
standardized data on over 250,000 SGs. We find that linkage through savings 
significantly enhances the performance of groups, as evidenced by the increase in 
savings per member and the return on savings. This suggests that members gain 
confidence in the safety that an account with a formal financial institution 
provides. This is, however, achieved at a cost, as the fund utilization rate, i.e., the 
share of the available funds that is lent out to the members, decreases for savings 
groups that are linked through savings, probably due to the fact that the group’s 
funds are now “locked up” in a savings account in a formal financial institution. 
Available funds at the group level seem therefore to be lent out to members at a 
higher interest rate, enhancing members’ return on savings. Thus, members that 
 
4 These figures pertain to savings groups that are supported by development actors (often referred to as 
facilitating agencies), such as CARE International, World Vision, etc. There are several savings groups that 
were spontaneously formed without the support of a facilitating agency. These groups are believed to have 
many more members, but exact estimates are not available (The Mastercard Foundation, 2014). 
5 See, for example, the national financial inclusion strategies for Uganda 
(https://www.bou.or.ug/bou/bouwebsite/bouwebsitecontent/publications/special_pubs/2017/National-





are net savers benefit most from the savings linkage while members that are net 
borrowers benefit less.6 
On the other hand, credit linkage significantly reduces the savings per member and 
the return on savings, which suggests that the infusion of external capital into the 
group is detrimental to the performance of these groups and thus curtails the wealth 
creation of individual members. We complement the empirical study with a 
qualitative field study to better understand the statistical results obtained.  
This study makes several contributions. First, we employ a large cross-country 
panel dataset, arguably the largest dataset on community-managed financial 
services available for a comparative study. The majority of studies on savings 
groups are based on RCTs or impact evaluations of a particular SG program 
operating in a particular area. In contrast to previous studies that have mainly 
focused on a single program, we employ a large dataset covering many SG projects 
worldwide that are supported by different facilitating agencies. Thus, our dataset 
allows us to contribute to a broader understanding of the SG model rather than the 
limited specialties of a single SG program. It also allows us to generalize our 
findings to a global population of these informal-sector initiatives. Further, we 
exploit a quasi-experimental design. Specifically, we employ a matched sample 
difference-in-differences specification. Linkage to a formal financial institution is 
not random. It is mainly recommended based on the performance of a group 
against a scorecard, usually the linkage readiness assessment tool developed by 
CARE International (CARE International, 2014). As a result, it is likely that well-
performing groups are linked to a formal financial institution. By matching linked 
groups to comparable unlinked groups, we aim to address the non-random nature 
of linkage. This, coupled with the difference-in-differences specification, is 
arguably a robust way to investigate our research question. 
The study also contributes to the growing literature on SGs. Previous studies have 
investigated the effects of participation in SGs on group members’ welfare 
(Beaman, Karlan, & Thuysbaert, 2014; Ksoll, Lilleør, Lønborg, & Rasmussen, 
2016; Karlan, Savonitto, Thuysbaert, & Udry, 2017). Scholars have also delved 
into how processes internal to the SG like group composition (Burlando & 
 





Canidio, 2017) and group formation (Greaney, Kaboski, & Van Leemput, 2016) 
affect the performance of SGs. While these studies have guided our understanding 
of SGs, our study accounts for external influences, specifically financial linkages, 
on SG performance. We capture SG performance using three different dimensions: 
savings per member, fund utilization rate, and return on savings. These dimensions 
portray the different ways through which SG members generate wealth for the 
group. Savings per member is an indicator for savings capacity while fund 
utilization and return on savings capture the efficiency with which groups use 
members’ savings to generate profits for the group. In a further analysis, we dig 
deeper into understanding how the interest rate on group loans varies with linkage. 
The interest rate is the transmission mechanism through which financial wealth is 
created when savings are turned into credit. 
The study also contributes to the literature on financial inclusion. Financial 
inclusion is currently high on the agenda of major global bodies. For example, the 
World Bank has heavily invested in efforts to increase formal financial inclusion, 
especially of low-income populations, through various projects like the Universal 
Financial Access 2020 (World Bank Group, 2018). Informal financial mechanisms 
such as savings groups provide reliable ways through which marginalized 
populations can be included in the formal financial system, especially in 
developing countries. By exploring how linkage with formal financial institutions 
influences the performance of these groups, this study can guide policy on how 
groups can be sustainably linked to formal financial institutions.  
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some background on savings 
groups, the concept of financial linkage, and the relevant literature. Section 3 
presents the data and summary statistics for the variables of interest. Section 4 
describes the empirical strategy applied in the paper and Section 5 presents the 
results and Section 6 concludes.  
2. Relevant Literature  
2.1 Background on savings groups 
“A savings group is a community-based financial institution that collects savings 
from its members into a common pool, lends those funds back to its members, and 




2017, p. 7). They are improvements upon the Rotating Savings and Credit 
Associations (ROSCAs) and Accumulating Savings and Credit Associations 
(ASCAs) (Beaman et al., 2014) that have been in existence for a long time 
(Bouman, 1995; Tavanti, 2013).  
The basic savings group model (the Village Savings and Loan Association) was 
founded in Niger by CARE International in the 1990s (Allen & Panetta, 2010). It 
was based on the foundation of the local tontine, an informal organization where 
members made regular contributions to a fund that was then given in full to one 
person at a time (Karlan et al., 2017). Other notable international development 
agencies have also developed variations of this model based on similar 
foundations. These include the Saving and Internal Lending Community (SILC) 
by Catholic Relief Services, Saving for Change (SfC) by Oxfam/Freedom From 
Hunger, PACT’s WORTH model, the Plan International and Aga Khan 
Foundation models. These development agencies are often referred to as 
facilitating agencies. They are normally involved in training communities on the 
savings groups’ methodology, assisting in group formation and supervision of the 
groups, especially during the initial cycle of the group (Allen & Panetta, 2010). 
The different SG variations share some common principles. SGs are typically 
composed of 15–25 self-selected members. On formation, a constitution is 
formulated that stipulates the rules governing the group’s operations. It includes 
rules on group leadership, i.e., what leadership positions exist, how leaders are 
elected, what services will be offered by the SG to its members (savings, credit, 
social fund), plus the terms for such services such as the savings cycle, the savings 
amount, savings withdrawal, and loan guidelines. It also includes rules on the day-
to-day operation of the SG such as meeting schedules, meeting attendance policies, 
and potential fines for those who violate the rules. For further discussion of the 
savings groups concept see Allen and Panetta (2010). 
In the scheduled meetings, which typically take place weekly, members contribute 
savings to the group fund and can take loans from the group fund at an interest rate 
predefined by the group (Burlando, Canidio, & Selby, 2016). Groups also normally 
choose to keep a social fund that is accessed by members in case of an emergency 
like a death or health crisis (Karlan et al., 2017). Hence the social fund reduces the 




With regard to the safety of funds and accountability for group transactions, all 
collected funds are kept in a cashbox with multiple locks, usually 3, whose keys 
are kept by different individual members as agreed upon by the group members, 
and which is opened only during group meetings (Ledgerwood et al., 2013). SG 
transactions are transparent, with each individual maintaining a passbook detailing 
their savings transactions. Additionally, the group normally maintains a central 
ledger detailing the group’s transactions and being regularly updated about the 
transactions that take place in the group meetings (Burlando & Canidio, 2017). 
The loan fund is shared out among the group members at the end of the cycle, 
typically annually, at which point changes may take place in the composition and 
rules of the group before a new cycle is initiated (Beaman et al., 2014). 
2.2 Linkage of savings groups with formal financial institutions 
Pagura and Kristen (2006, p. 2) define financial linkages as “any mutually 
beneficial partnership between a formal and a less formal institution that results in 
the expansion of rural financial services.” They further classify linkages into two 
types, namely, facilitating and direct financial linkages. In facilitating linkages, the 
formal financial institutions hire the less-formal institutions to work on their 
behalf. By contrast, in direct linkages formal financial institutions “help less-
formal institutions diversify their sources of funding, expand their loanable funds 
and/or balance liquidity shortages and excesses” (Pagura & Kristen, 2006, p. 6). 
In this paper, the focus is on direct linkages.  
Linkage with a formal financial institution can be initiated by the SGs itself or 
through a facilitating agency like CARE, Plan International, the Agha Khan 
Foundation, and so on. SGs sometimes form linkages with semi-formal institutions 
like Savings & Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs). For example, CARE Rwanda 
encourages linkages between SGs and the Umurenge SACCO (Rippey, 2017). In 
other instances, SGs are linked to formal financial institutions (e.g., Barclays 
Bank) through the Banking on Change initiative where the bank cooperates with a 
facilitating agency (CARE and Plan International) to expand financial inclusion in 
various developing countries like Egypt, Uganda, Tanzania, Peru, and more 
(Barclays, 2016). 
Most studies that investigate the influence of financial linkage on SGs focus on 




evidence on the same. Allen (2007) and Rippey (2008) evaluate the impact of 
linkage on the Mata Masu Dubara (Women on the Move) project in Niger. The 
Mata Masu Dubara project, initiated by CARE International in 1991, was the first 
modern and innovative savings group program and in 2004 some of the groups 
received external loans from microfinance institutions and credit unions (Rippey, 
2017). Findings from the two independently conducted studies reveal a risk of 
over-indebtedness as the groups were receiving multiple loans. Additionally, the 
studies find a drop in the membership of the linked groups while the unlinked 
groups continued to grow. The authors attributed this to stress within the linked 
groups due to the handling of the external loans (Rippey, 2008). 
Maes (2007) documents a case study on the CARE CLASSE-Intambwe 
(Community Learning and Action for Savings Stimulation and Enhancement & 
Business) model in Rwanda. Under this model, SGs form federations 
(intergroupments) through which they can access external credit from credit 
unions (Banques Populaires). Findings from the study include an increased 
savings rate over time. However, it is not clear whether this is due to linkages or 
due to the 25 percent deposit required by the credit unions in order to acquire a 
loan. Moreover, because the internal savings are sometimes used as collateral, the 
study finds that the rate at which members’ savings are converted into loans is low. 
Studying savings and credit cooperative societies in Tanzania, Ndiege, Qin, 
Kazungu, and Moshi (2014) find that as informal institutions receive more external 
funds, their sustainability, as measured by the operating self-sufficiency, 
decreases. This is because as more external funds become available, the internal 
savings mobilization behavior of the group decreases and the debt burden of the 
institution increases, leading to adverse effects on portfolio quality and hence poor 
performance (Ndiege et al., 2014; Ndiege, Haule, & Kazungu, 2013). Owing to the 
fact that there are external funds in the group, members feel less of a sense of group 
ownership, less solidarity, and have less responsibility for external funds, 
sometimes referred to as “cold money” (Murray & Rosenberg, 2006). This is 
further supported by Ishengoma (2015) who finds that microfinance cooperatives 
(MFCs) that do not have access to loans from formal financial institutions seem to 





While research on credit linkage often reveals negative results on SG performance, 
researchers often find a positive effect of savings linkage on SG performance. 
Evaluating the CARE Link Up project in Tanzania and Kenya where a number of 
SGs are linked to formal financial institutions, it was observed that groups that 
opened accounts with formal financial institutions had a higher return on savings 
(CARE International, 2017; Eckhoff et al., 2019). Additionally, these groups 
experienced an increase in savings compared to the unlinked groups (Vandergaag, 
Kwilasa, & Krause, 2017). This was attributed to the increase in trust among group 
members that came with knowing that their savings were stored in a safe place 
(Eckhoff et al., 2019).  
2.3 Why financial linkage may influence savings groups’ performance 
Linkage to a formal financial institution most likely has an effect on the 
performance of savings groups. Formal financial institutions usually have to 
follow a strict set of procedures in order to meet requirements from the central 
regulatory authorities or other stakeholders. Such procedures include “Know Your 
Customer” requirements that involve rigorous background checks before carrying 
out transactions with customers. When savings groups establish relationships with 
formal financial institutions, they have to adhere to some of these procedures as 
laid out. Given their informal nature, these groups may sometimes not have the 
administrative capacity to meet the standards required by formal financial 
institutions (Balkenhol & Gueye, 1994; Aryeetey, 2003). Additionally, financial 
linkage may entail extra operational costs for savings group members as they have 
to make regular trips to the formal financial institution to deposit and withdraw 
money. Given the differences in their operational models and legal structures, 
financial linkage thus affects savings groups’ performance. 
It should, however, be argued that a savings linkage does not necessarily have the 
same effect on an SG’s performance as a credit linkage. In a savings linkage, the 
group has a joint savings account with a formal financial institution. Groups 
usually distribute loans and deposit any excess cash into these accounts. This 
provides groups with a safe place to keep their excess cash. A savings linkage may 
thus increase group members’ trust in the security of their savings, which 
encourages them to save more and ultimately increases the amount of funds 
available in the group’s loan fund. At the same time, however, it may sow mistrust 




access to their cash as it is “locked up” in an account at a formal financial 
institution. Moreover, it may now be more inconvenient to withdraw money, which 
may be reflected in lower lending levels in the group.  
By contrast, in a credit linkage the group receives a joint loan from a formal 
financial institution. The infusion of external credit into the group means that the 
group holds joint liability for the loan, which may bring about tensions if some 
group members default on their individual loans taken out of the group loan fund. 
Additionally, members who are more financially literate may take advantage of 
the other group members and appropriate bigger loans to themselves. All this may 
bring about conflicts among group members, such as those experienced among 
solidarity groups in traditional microfinance schemes (Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999), 
which may ultimately affect group performance. A credit linkage may also make 
groups more reliant on external funds, thus discouraging internal savings 
mobilization. Moreover, as Bennett, Goldberg, and Hunte (1996) argue, linkage 
through credit creates a situation of dependency rather than a sense of group 
ownership, which may in turn affect loan repayment.  
Moreover, financial linkage may exacerbate the conflict between net savers and 
net borrowers usually faced by financial institutions with a cooperative model 
(Branch and Baker, 2000; Taylor, 1971). Net savers are interested in earning high 
returns from their savings and hence are in support of high interest rates on loans. 
By contrast, net borrowers are in support of favorable interest rates. Since financial 
linkage may have an impact on the internal interest rate charged on group loans, it 
may lead to conflicts between the net savers and the net borrowers in the group. 
Finally, since an SG is a transparent member-based system, the conditions it 
negotiates with the bank are directly observable to all members. For example, bank 
representatives usually visit the groups to explain to them the bank products 
(Burlando, Goldberg, & Etcheverry, 2020).  This transparency is likely to affect 
the internal borrowing conditions, i.e., the interest rate charged on internal group 
loans. If, for example, groups are linked for credit and negotiate an annual interest 
rate for the loan from a formal financial institution, it will be very difficult for them 
to then set an overly high interest rate on loans to group members. Instead, there 
will be pressure to reduce the interest rate on internal group loans, which may 




3. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
3.1 Data 
Data for this study was obtained from the Savings Group Information Exchange 
(SAVIX). The SAVIX is an online platform containing data on community-
managed savings groups. It is based on a management information system 
developed by the Village Savings & Loan Associates, an organization whose 
objective is to provide deprived households with a safe place to save and borrow 
under flexible conditions (http://www.vsla.net/). Different facilitating agencies 
report data on a range of operational and financial metrics by uploading data to the 
management information system. The operational metrics include group 
composition (female versus male membership), group dynamics (dropout rate, 
meeting attendance rate), and performance metrics (net savings value, total assets, 
repayment performance, value of loans outstanding, etc.). The information 
reported to the SAVIX provides sufficient data to calculate several ratios like the 
fund utilization rate and the return on savings that are a relevant representation of 
the performance of SGs. 
The major strength of the SAVIX lies in the richness of the data: it is the first 
platform of its kind to facilitate the collection of extensive quality data in this 
sector. Additionally, the data is not reported by the groups themselves but rather 
collected by independent field staff who upload data to the platform on a quarterly 
basis. Currently, the SAVIX covers over 276,000 savings groups located globally.7 
Many of the groups in the SAVIX are in Africa (over 88 percent) (Mersland et al., 
2019). 
The concept of financial linkage is still new to the sector and, as a result, few 
savings groups are linked with a formal financial institution. In constructing the 
dataset for this study, as an initial step, we considered only groups that were linked 
to a formal financial institution. Moreover, only groups having at least two quarters 
of data were included in this study. Hence, the initial sample of linked groups was 
matched with the pool of groups not linked to a formal financial institution to yield 
the final dataset used to investigate our research question. The matching procedure 






located in 31 countries across Africa and Asia for the period from 2010 to 2017. 
Table 1 presents the country distribution of the groups included in the sample. 





Country Number of SGs 
Ghana 1,130  Egypt 20 
Rwanda 694  Burundi 14 
Tanzania 310  Mozambique 12 
Togo 300  Zambia 12 
Tajikistan 102  Cameroon 10 
India 100  Madagascar 10 
Senegal 78  Nigeria 8 
Ivory Coast 68  Philippines 8 
South Africa 66  Benin 6 
Uganda 58  Guinea 6 
Myanmar 50  Afghanistan 4 
Kenya 36  Ethiopia 4 
Malawi 34  Nicaragua 2 
Sierra Leone 34  Pakistan 2 
Zimbabwe 32  Republic of the Congo 2 
Burkina Faso 22  Total 3,234 
 
Two independent dummy variables are explored in this study. Credit linkage takes 
the value of 1 if a group is linked through credit and 0 otherwise. Similarly, savings 
linkage takes the value of 1 if a group is linked through savings and 0 otherwise.  
Following Ledgerwood et al. (2013), Greaney et al. (2016), and Burlando and 
Canidio (2017), we use three indicators – savings per member, fund utilization 
rate, and return on savings – as proxies for SG performance. The three performance 
indicators represent three core aspects of the SG operational model. We will now 




Savings per member represents the savings capacity of the group members. It is 
derived by dividing the value of total members’ savings in the current cycle by the 
number of active members in the group.  
The fund utilization rate represents the rate at which members’ savings are 
converted into loans. The main way groups make profits on members’ savings is 
by lending out this money to group members at interest. The fund utilization rate 
is used to measure how much money is lent out per dollar saved and is derived as 
a ratio of the value of loans outstanding to the value of savings. A higher fund 
utilization rate implies that the groups are actively converting members’ savings 
into loans and hence leaving less money inactively stored in the group’s cashbox.  
Finally, the return on savings represents the profitability of the group. Members’ 
savings are lent out at an interest rate predetermined by the group members at the 
beginning of the cycle. The return on savings is calculated as a ratio of total profit 
to the average savings and is a measure of returns per dollar saved.  
Cognizant of the fact that the SGs in the sample are at different stages of maturity 
and size, SG-specific controls are drawn on to minimize the effects of such 
differences. Older groups with more experience (successive cycles) may deal with 
member relations, manage group operations, and perform better than younger 
groups. Larger groups with more assets may benefit from financial linkage more 
than smaller groups due to scale effects. Following Mersland, Nyarko, and Szafarz 
(2019) and D’Espallier, Guerin, and Mersland (2013), we proxy the size of a 
savings group by the natural logarithm of total assets of the group. 
All ratios used in the study are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percent cutoff levels to 
minimize the influence of extreme values. 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
In Table 2, we define and present descriptive statistics for the variables used in this 
study. It can be seen that around 4% of the SGs are linked through credit while 
around 46% are linked through savings. 
Savings groups are grassroots organizations, as reflected in the following 
descriptive statistics on group savings and loans. The average savings per member 




high percentage of members’ savings are given out to members who need loans: 
only 30 percent of the members’ savings are left in the loan fund and not distributed 
as loans. On average, 51.56 percent of the members take out loans and the average 
loan size is 22.64 USD. Typically, loans are not used for business purposes but 
mainly to cover different consumption needs like school fees, uniforms, or food 
(Karlan et al., 2012). Moreover, the fact that only around half of the members take 
loans from the group suggests that up to half of the members are interested in the 
savings function of the group rather than in taking out loans. We also see that return 
on savings is on average 35 percent, which speaks to the nature of interest rates set 
in savings groups. Interest rates in savings groups are typically higher than those 
in formal financial institutions. Further, we see that the average savings group has 
a social fund of 36.99 USD. This fund is typically used by group members in case 
of an emergency.  
The average SG has an asset size of 1078.14 USD and has been in existence for 
approximately 609 days (about a year and a half). Furthermore, the average 
dropout rate is low (1.2 percent) and the average attendance rate is high (91 
percent). These two features represent member satisfaction with the group and 





Table 2: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Financial Linkage 
      
Credit Linkage 1 if the group has joint liability, 
outstanding loan from a regulated 
financial institution 
11,174 0.04 0 0.13 0 1 
Savings Linkage 1 if the group has a joint savings 
product (such as a savings account or 
a term deposit) with a regulated 
financial institution 
11,174 0.46 0 0.41 0 1 
Savings groups’ Performance 
     
Savings per member Savings per member 11,174 33.67 21.84 35.05 0 150.44 
Fund utilization rate Value of loans outstanding/value of 
member savings 
11,152 69.77 79.14 45.14 0 173.37 
ROS Return on savings 11,152 34.93 23.11 41.14 -14.29 222.99 
SG characteristics 
      
Age Age of group in days                                                                         11,174 608.66 420 557.96 2.00 2527 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets 11,169 6.31 6.53 1.39 -4.32 8.45 
Total Assets Total assets of group 11,174 1078.14 686.10 1143.83 0 4666.99 
Dropout rate Percentage of members exiting group 
for various reasons 
11,174 1.20 0 4.87 0 33.33 
Attendance rate Percentage of members attending 
meetings 
11,174 91.14 96.67 12.56 41.67 100 
Members with loans 
outstanding 
Percentage of members with 
outstanding loans 
11,174 51.56 57.14 33.52 0 100 
Average loan size Value of loans outstanding/active 
members in the group 
11,174 22.64 13.57 27.76 0 128.16 
Value of loans 
outstanding 
Value of loans outstanding 11,174 575.66 332.06 711.11 0 3073.24 
Social fund Cash kept in other funds for 
emergency purposes 





4. Empirical Strategy 
4.1 Matching 
In investigating how financial linkages impact the different group-level outcomes, we are 
faced with the empirical problem of endogeneity. It could be the case that it is not linkage 
that is driving performance but rather performance that is driving linkage. This is because 
linkage is recommended based on SGs’ score as determined by what is known as the 
“linkage readiness assessment tool.” The tool, developed by CARE (CARE International, 
2014), assesses groups along several criteria before they are considered eligible for linkage. 
The linkage readiness assessment tool is adopted by various facilitating agencies 
considering linking their supported groups to formal financial institutions. The tool 
functions as a scorecard that contains both quantitative and qualitative measures of groups’ 
readiness for linkage. The decision to recommend linkage for a group depends on the final 
score that the group attains. Savings groups that perform well are likely to get linked, and 
so it is possible that performance drives linkage and not the other way around, resulting in 
reverse causality. 
Using instrumental variables is a common way to tackle endogeneity concerns in research.  
However, it is hard to find an instrumental variable that is related to financial linkage but 
with arguably little relation to our group-level outcomes. Therefore, instead of an 
instrumental variable, we use a matching procedure8 to build a counterfactual situation of 
how the performance measures would be for the linked groups had they not been linked. 
Based on several characteristics before the linkage, we build a matched sample of groups 
that are not linked to a formal financial institution. Specifically, for each linked group, we 
drop all observations recorded after the linkage happened. Then we average the pre-linkage 
observations for linked groups and all available observations for unlinked groups by 
averaging the time element of the data. This averaged data thus forms the sample on which 
matching is carried out. We define treatment as being linked or not. For simplicity, groups 
that are linked to a formal financial institution are referred to as “treated” groups while 
those that are not linked are referred to as “control” groups. The goal of this matching is to 
create a sample of matched control groups, taken from the large pool of groups not linked 
 




to a formal financial institution, that are as similar as possible to the treated groups prior to 
being linked (Stuart, 2010; King & Nielsen, 2019). 
In constructing the control group sample, we use the following criteria. Out of the large 
pool of groups that are not linked to a formal financial institution, we consider only savings 
groups that are domiciled in the same country and have the same facilitating agency as the 
linked groups. We define facilitating agency as a nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
that offers support to the mobilization and training of savings groups (Allen & Panetta, 
2010; Ledgerwood et al., 2013). Examples include organizations like CARE, Catholic 
Relief Services, World Vision, etc. Additionally, we consider only groups that are located 
(in terms of rural versus urban location) in the same area as those in the treated sample. 
Ensuring that the treated and matched control groups are exactly the same along the above 
characteristics minimizes the differences between them. Furthermore, we use nearest 
neighbor matching to choose from the remaining savings groups the control group with the 
lowest Mahalanobis distance from the treated group (Rubin, 1980; Stuart & Rubin, 2004). 
We select matched control groups according to the same characteristics as used by the 
linkage readiness assessment tool to assess whether the group is ready for linkage to a 
formal financial institution or not, namely, meeting attendance rate, fund utilization rate, 
maturity of groups (here proxied by age), savings volume, average loan per member, 
dropout rate, and percentage of members with loan outstanding. For groups that have more 
than one possible match, we keep only the first matched pair. The resulting data contains 
information on 3,234 savings groups (1,617 treated groups and 1,617 matched control 
groups) that form the basis for the empirical analysis in this study. 
4.2 Reliability of the matching method 
To check that our matched “control” and “treated” samples are as similar as possible, Table 
3 presents the t-tests for the matching characteristics (in Panel A) and other group-level 
characteristics (Panel B). Overall, the matching satisfies the stated purpose of removing 
differences between the “treated” and “control” savings groups along the matching 
characteristics and several other savings groups’ characteristics. In particular, the p-values 
for the mean comparison test range from 0.131 for return on savings to 0.975 for the fund 




tests, we can conclude that the matched “control” groups provide reliable counterfactuals 




Table 3: Univariate t-test results comparing the treated and matched groups 
    Obs. Mean p-value (diff. in 
means) 
Panel A. Matching characteristics 
Age Linked groups 1617 517.48 0.805  
Matched controls 1617 521.91 
 
Dropout rate Linked groups 1617 1.059 0.483  
Matched controls 1617 0.967 
 
Value of savings Linked groups 1617 832.50 0.303  
Matched controls 1617 803.00 
 
Attendance rate Linked groups 1617 91.633 0.313  
Matched controls 1617 92.000 
 
Fund utilization rate Linked groups 1617 66.811 0.975  
Matched controls 1617 66.769 
 
Members with loans outstanding Linked groups 1617 48.624 0.597  
Matched controls 1617 48.117 
 
Average loan size Linked groups 1617 21.040 0.314  
Matched controls 1617 20.239 
 
    Obs. Mean p-value (diff. in 
means) 
Panel B. Other characteristics 
Total Assets Linked groups 1617 1043.1 0.281  
Matched controls 1617 1004.2 
 
Return on savings Linked groups 1617 32.305 0.131  
Matched controls 1617 30.586 
 
Savings per member Linked groups 1617 33.488 0.222  
Matched controls 1617 32.117 
 
Value of loans outstanding Linked groups 1617 530.58 0.387  
Matched controls 1617 512.80 
 
Cash in other funds Linked groups 1617 35.781 0.496 




4.3 Difference-in-differences estimation 
To investigate the impact that financial linkages have on savings groups’ performance, we 
estimate a difference-in-differences specification as follows: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = αi + 𝛼𝑓 × 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛼𝑐 × 𝛼𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 
where i is the savings group, t is the quarters, 𝑦 is the group-level outcomes, 𝛼𝑖 is savings 
group fixed effects, 𝛼𝑓 × 𝛼𝑡 is facilitating agency by time effects, 𝛼𝑐 × 𝛼𝑡  is country by 
time effects, 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is a set of time-varying savings group-specific controls, and 
𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝐿𝑖𝑛𝑘𝑎𝑔𝑒 is a savings and credit linkage. The latter variable is a dummy that 
equals one if a group is linked through savings or credit and zero otherwise. We let  denote 
the error term. Our coefficients of interest, 𝛽1 and 𝛽2, discriminate the impact that different 
linkage types have on the savings groups’ performance. 
We control for any unobserved time-invariant differences across savings groups by 
including group fixed effects. We further include facilitating agency by time fixed effects 
to account for time-invariant differences in the facilitating agencies supporting the groups. 
Similarly, country by time fixed effects account for the time invariant heterogeneity in the 
different countries in which the groups are located. We estimate the equation with the error 
term clustered at the group level. 
4.4 Qualitative field study 
In addition to the analysis of the SAVIX database, we conducted a field study in Uganda 
to gain an in-depth understanding of how linkage to a formal financial institution influences 
the performance of savings groups. The insights obtained from the field study are used here 
as supplementary evidence supporting the results of the statistical analysis. Using 
convenience sampling, we held focus group discussions with eight groups from the districts 
of Iganga, Manafwa, and Kampala in Uganda. Five of the groups visited are part of the 
iSAVE9 project aimed at assuring the inclusion of persons with disabilities in savings 
groups. iSAVE is supported by the Norwegian Association of the Disabled. Two other 
 
9 The iSAVE project is a typical example of how savings groups are being used to reach the largely marginalized 





groups are supported by CARE Uganda and one by the Strømme Foundation. Additionally, 
interviews were conducted with the different field and program officers implementing the 
different projects. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 The effect of a savings linkage on savings groups’ performance  
Results for the effect of savings linkage are reported in the first row of Table 4. As observed 
in Column 1, a savings linkage has a positive and significant relation to the savings per 
member. This indicates that the savings per member increases significantly following a 
savings linkage with a formal financial institution. Specifically, the savings per member 
increases by 1.484 USD, corresponding to an increase by 4.4% given an average savings 
per member of 33.56 USD prior to linkage. This finding is similar to Maes (2007) and 
Vandergaag et al. (2017) who find an increase in the savings among linked groups in the 
CARE Link Up project. A savings account in a formal financial institution provides a safe 
place for groups to save their excess money. As some group members confirmed during 
our field visit, SGs sometimes open a savings account in a formal financial institution for 
security reasons.  For example, one member noted that “As savings accumulate, it poses a 
security risk and so we need an account for safety” (iSAVE group member, February 6, 
2019). This security increases trust among group members (Eckhoff et al., 2019), which in 
turn encourages them to save more. 
In column 5 of Table 4, we observe a positive and significant relation between savings 
linkage and return on savings. The coefficient indicates that a savings linkage increases 
ROS by 12.132 percentage points, which corresponds to an increase of 38.3% given an 
average pre-linkage ROS of 31.69%. This finding concurs with Eckhoff et al. (2019) who 
find higher returns for groups that opened savings accounts in the CARE Link Up project. 
Le Polain et al. (2018) find that groups turn accumulated savings into credit specifically 
for security reasons: in order to maintain a minimal amount of money in the cashbox, group 
members are encouraged to take extra loans when there is a lot of cash left in the box at 
the end of the meeting. What this may mean is that the interest rate on such unsolicited 
loans is also reduced to encourage members to take extra loans. Given the safekeeping 




solicit members to take extra loans at reduced rates. Consequently, a higher interest rate 
could be set, resulting in a higher return on savings for groups linked through savings. 
Further analysis of the effect of savings linkage on ROS is presented in Section 5.3. 
The findings further show that the positive effects of a savings linkage are however 
achieved at the cost of a significant reduction in the fund utilization rate. The coefficient 
of -6.095 (Column 3) signifies a reduction by 6.1 percentage points. Given a pre-linkage 
fund utilization rate of 65.89%, this corresponds to a reduction by 9.26%. Similar to the 
return on savings, it is likely that this finding is due to the fact that groups with a savings 
account don’t need to pressure members to take extra loans in order to reduce the amount 
of money in the cashbox. Alternatively, formal financial institutions usually have their 
branches in peri-urban or urban areas, which is a disincentive for groups to make regular 
withdrawals as it is costly for savings groups to make frequent trips to urban centers for 
that purpose. This coincides with a similar concern expressed by several respondents 
during the field interviews. One respondent told us: “The process of taking the money to 
the bank and then withdrawing it when you want to use it is expensive” (field officer, 
Manafwa district, February 6, 2019). This situation is exacerbated by the poor rural 
infrastructure that makes travel even harder. In acknowledgment of this, another 
respondent shared: “Some groups live high up in the mountains, which are sometimes 
affected by natural disasters” (field officer, Manafwa district, February 6, 2019). All this 
goes to show the costs that members have to bear if they keep their extra savings in a formal 
financial institution. Moreover, on occasions where groups need to move large amounts of 
money to and from the bank, they face a risk of theft. Indeed, some members related that 
“It is risky to move with such monies” (CARE member, Iganga District, February 7, 2019). 
In addition, there are fees incurred per transaction in formal financial institutions that are 
oftentimes unknown to SG members. As one program manager put it, “One thing that 
disgruntles members is when they start deducting their money in charges” (CARE program 
manager, February 8, 2019). To reduce costs related to deposits and withdrawals, groups 





Table 4: Financial Linkages and the Performance of SGs10 
 Savings per member  Fund utilization rate  ROS 
Variables (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6) 
         
Savings Linkage 1.484**   -6.095***   12.132***  
 (0.684)   (1.245)   (1.348)  
Credit Linkage  -10.011***   4.570   -31.440*** 
  (2.049)   (3.951)   (4.894) 
Age 0.002 0.002  0.009*** 0.006*  -0.010*** -0.006* 
 (0.002) (0.002)  (0.003) (0.003)  (0.003) (0.003) 
Size 15.043*** 15.108***  13.128*** 13.013***  12.564*** 12.892*** 
 (0.363) (0.363)  (0.493) (0.493)  (0.477) (0.479) 
         
Agency-time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Country-time fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 11,169 11,169  11,151 11,151  11,151 11,151 
R-squared 0.475 0.476  0.150 0.147  0.154 0.150 
Number of SGs 3,234 3,234  3,234 3,234  3,234 3,234 
Table 4 shows the results for the relationship between financial linkage (credit and savings linkage) and SG performance (measured by the savings per member, 
fund utilization rate and return on savings). Refer to table 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
10 Results are consistent even with the addition of within-cycle fixed effects to the model. The within-cycle fixed effects account for effects arising during the 




5.2 The effect of a credit linkage on savings groups’ performance  
Results for the effect of credit linkage are reported in the second row of the Table 4. In 
Column 2, we observe that the credit linkage dummy is negatively and significantly related 
to savings per member. This indicates that savings groups that are linked through credit 
have significantly lower savings per member. The estimated coefficient of -10.011 
(Column 2) is statistically significant at the 1% level. Given an average savings per member 
of 32.73 USD for credit-linked groups prior to linkage, this effect corresponds to a 
reduction of 30.59%. The reduction in savings per member stems from the fact that the 
infusion of external capital reduces the savings mobilization drive among the members as 
they become more reliant on the external capital. This result is similar to that of Ndiege et 
al. (2014) who observe that external funds lower the savings motive among Tanzanian 
savings and credit cooperative societies. Moreover, the infusion of external funds into the 
groups could affect the groups’ sense of ownership because such money come from sources 
other than their own savings (Bennett et al., 1996). This may also lead some members to 
cut back on their savings amounts. After all, with credit linkage, the groups could have 
enough resources to carry on with their activities without necessarily boosting their 
savings.  
The results further reveal that the credit linkage dummy is negatively and significantly 
related to return on savings. As can be seen in Column 6, credit-linked groups have a 
significantly lower return on savings and the estimated coefficient is 31.440. This signifies 
that the ROS of credit-linked groups is on average 31 percentage points lower than that of 
their savings-linked and unlinked counterparts. Given an average return on savings of 
38.98 percent for credit-linked groups prior to linkage, this reduction is highly 
economically significant. One explanation for the observed reduction in the return on 
savings rests on the fact that groups have to pay interest on the borrowed funds from the 
bank. An alternative explanation is the fact that with access to external credit, funds are 
more available in the group and, as a result, groups have to the reduce interest rates in order 
to encourage members to take loans. Moreover, group members are aware of the interest 
rate negotiated for the external credit from the formal financial institution and hence, from 
a moral perspective, some groups may consider it wrong to lend to members at a much 




In Columns 4 of Table 4, we find, surprisingly, that credit linkage is insignificant 
suggesting that credit linkage has no effect on the fund utilization rate (the rate at which 
savings are converted into loans). The main reason put forward in prescribing credit linkage 
for groups is that the internal members’ savings are inadequate to meet the credit needs of 
the members. If this argument were valid, then we would expect group members to demand 
more credit when the group has access to external credit. Yet, our results show that credit 
linkage has no significant effect on fund utilization rate. Together with the reduction in 
savings per member observed above, this suggests that the external credit substitutes for 
the reduced internal savings and hence the utilization rate remains the same. 
Examining the control variables, it is interesting to note that lower ROS is associated with 
older groups. This shows that as groups mature, members gain in social capital and mutual 
knowledge, and hence can give loans to each other at lower interest rates. It could also 
signify that group members are now familiar with the methodology and no longer accept 
the interest rate recommended in the facilitating agency guidelines but adjust it to fit their 
capabilities. We also see that higher performance is associated with SGs that have larger 
assets. 
Overall, the results show that savings linkage is mostly beneficial for group performance. 
We observe an increase in savings per member and return on savings but with a side 
concern of a reduced fund utilization rate as money is locked away in the bank. The security 
of a savings account in a formal financial institution motivates group members to save 
more. Moreover, the group can now set higher interest rates on loans, resulting in an 
increase in return on savings. The increase in interest rates, however, benefits net savers at 
the expense of net borrowers who now must pay a higher interest rate to access loans from 
the group fund.  
By contrast, credit linkage has, in general, a negative effect on the performance of savings 
groups. Even if funds are available to group members at a cheaper rate, the internal savings 
mobilization behavior of the group decreases. This increases members’ dependency on 
external credit and may end up locking them in a vicious cycle. The quantitative results 
support the qualitative concerns raised during the field visits. For example, one field officer 
cautioned that “If you link them via credit, it will break them” (Strømme Foundation field 




formal financial institutions, they sometimes overborrow and then default on these loans. 
It should be noted, however, that there is some benefit arising from a credit linkage. The 
observed insignificant effect on the fund utilization rate shows that extra credit from the 
bank is lent to the group members in the same proportion as before the linkage, which 
means that the extra resources to the group trickle down to the members. It further shows 
that there seem to be a real demand for the extra credit, and that it is not forced on the 
groups.   
5.3 Additional analysis 
To further understand the effect of financial linkage on return on savings observed in Table 
4, we conduct the additional analysis described below. Financial linkage can have an 
impact on ROS through two potential channels: a direct and an indirect channel. The effect 
may be direct through revenue earned from the interest on saved funds for savings-linked 
groups and through extra costs incurred to acquire a loan for credit-linked groups. The 
effect may also be indirect through higher interest rates charged on a group loan for 
savings-linked groups and lower interest rates charged on a group loan for credit-linked 
groups. However, it should be noted that the direct revenue earned from the interest on 
savings and the direct cost incurred from interest on loans are an order of magnitude lower 
than the indirect effect. This is because the interest on savings in formal accounts are mostly 
calculated on an annual rather than weekly basis while the credit offered to the savings 
groups is often subsidized. We accordingly focus on the indirect effect. 
We utilize univariate mean and median comparison tests to test whether there are 
significant differences between the means and medians of the interest rate before and after 
linkage. Specifically, we apply paired samples t-tests and chi-square statistics for the mean 
and median tests, respectively. We conduct the tests only for savings-linked groups. Due 
to data limitations, we are not able to conduct this additional analysis for the credit-linked 
groups. 
The interest rate proxy is calculated by dividing the change in profits across cycles by the 
value of loans outstanding (all numbers are expressed on an annual basis). The variable is 





We follow a step-by-step approach to check for consistency of the observed results. We 
start by investigating data that has been aggregated over time for each group. Put 
differently, we take the average interest rate for each group before and after the linkage. 
Groups with missing average values in any period (before or after linkage) are not included 
in the univariate analysis. This generates a final sample of 164 groups. Results shown in 
Table 5 indicate that the interest rate for savings-linked groups increases significantly after 
linkage. The median interest rate increases from 27% to 48%.  
For the second approach, we limit the data to the period surrounding the linkage. We 
consider one period before linkage and the linkage period in order to see if there is a change 
in interest rates due to linkage. To be included in the sample, groups need to have no 
missing data on the interest rate in the periods surrounding the linkage. The final analysis 
is performed on 64 savings-linked groups. The results presented in Table 5 indicate that 
the interest rate for savings-linked groups increases significantly after linkage, with the 
median interest rate increasing from 24% to 54%. 
Table 5: Interest Rate Before and After Financial Linkage 











Average interest rate 
before and after linkage 0.5011 0.7989 -3.3239*** 
 
0.2673 0.4830 15.760*** 
One period before 
linkage and at linkage 0.3486 0.9595 -4.4331*** 
 
0.2412 0.5412 18.848*** 
*, **, and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 
Overall, the results suggest that a savings linkage induces an increase in the interest rate on 
group loans. 
6. Conclusion 
Recent developments encourage financial linkage between savings groups and formal 
financial institutions. Savings groups provide excluded communities with an opportunity 
to save and borrow money and acquire basic financial management skills. These 
community-level informal savings groups thus present a platform through which many 




Report notes that about 25% of savers in developing economies reported using an informal 
mechanism as their only form of saving (Demirguc-Kunt et al., 2018). Hence, linking such 
informal mechanisms to formal financial institutions contributes to the overall financial 
inclusion agenda that is currently being pursued by major economic actors. With access to 
a group account, group members are able to create financial histories upon which they can 
build and open individual personal accounts. However, as financial linkage contributes to 
formal financial inclusion, it is also important to understand how this linkage influences 
the performance of SGs and hence affects the operational model of these SGs.  
To the best of our knowledge, no study has endeavored to conduct a rigorous econometric 
investigation of the effects of financial linkage. This paper is the first to conduct a rigorous 
empirical investigation clearly differentiating the effects of a savings linkage from those of 
a credit linkage. Further, the study responds to various recent practitioner calls for a 
rigorous empirical study into the influence of financial linkage on savings groups (Gash, 
2017; Nelson & Gash, 2016; Seel, 2018). The study seeks to understand how the different 
linkage types (in terms of credit versus savings linkage) relate to savings groups’ 
performance. Using a unique large matched sample dataset of 3,234 savings groups from 
31 different countries, we empirically study the above relations. Specifically, we use a 
difference-in-differences specification together with a field study in order to explore the 
phenomenon.   
In general, the results indicate that linking savings groups with savings accounts in formal 
financial institutions has significant effects on the performance of the groups. We find that 
savings per member is increased, utilization rate is decreased, and return on savings goes 
up. We argue that this is attributed to the safety function that a savings account in a formal 
financial institution provides. However, the significant increase in group wealth as a result 
of a savings linkage is mainly enjoyed by group members who are net savers as their 
savings now fetch higher interest rates when converted into loans for other group members. 
The net borrowers in this instance now have to pay higher interest on borrowed funds.  
As for credit linkage, we generally observe a negative effect on group outcomes. We find 
that it reduces savings per member possibly due to the fact that internal mobilization of 




on savings potentially as a result of the reduction in interest rates resulting from more 
money being available to the group through credit.  
These findings are robust in a multivariate setting even when group-specific controls are 
included in the estimated model. In light of this, a number of policy recommendations 
emerge. Savings group promoters should ensure that financial linkage is demand-driven. 
SGs that consider linking with formal financial institutions should carefully assess their 
peculiar situation and needs and choose the kind of linkage that meets those needs. They 
must be aware of the pros and cons of both types of linkage and the associated possible 
tradeoffs. For example, linkage through savings encourages savings but at the same time it 
reduces the rate at which these savings are converted into loans, i.e., the fund utilization 
rate, and thus does not benefit the net borrowers. 
Additionally, based on the objective they intend to achieve, development organizations 
should exercise caution when prescribing financial linkage for savings groups. The finding 
that savings linkage reduces the fund utilization rate while increasing the return on savings 
may imply that groups use the interest rate as a discriminatory mechanism such that with 
the increased safety of funds, groups have the alternative to set a higher interest rate, which 
means that members who cannot afford this are barred from taking out loans. This would 
run counter to financial inclusion efforts.  
Furthermore, based on the detrimental effects observed arising from credit linkage, we 
would recommend that savings groups’ promoters recommend credit linkage only after 
doing a thorough analysis of the benefits that would accrue from it. Linkages should not 
be prescribed just to meet the promoters’ own goals but should be aimed at benefiting the 
groups and their members. 
Policy makers often recommend integration between the formal and informal sectors. The 
argument put out is that such integration or linkage promotes effectiveness and efficiency 
in the informal sector. Yet, according to our findings, the outcome of such integration is 
not as straightforward as is often assumed but rather nuanced. Thus, while linkage can 
produce some positive outcomes, it can at the same time distort dynamics and certain core 




tradeoffs associated with formal-informal sector linkage. Our study informs policy 
recommendations in this regard. 
This research can be expanded on in several ways. Whereas the present study provides 
evidence on linkage between savings groups and formal financial institutions, we are 
unable to ascertain the type of formal financial institutions that directly influence such 
linkage. Do savings groups reap more benefits when they are linked to, say, Savings and 
Credit Cooperatives (SACCOs) than when they are linked to mainstream commercial 
banks? Future studies can explore the linkage between savings groups and specific types 
of formal financial institutions such as commercial banks, credit unions, and microfinance 
institutions. Such an inquiry can provide specific insights into the types of formal financial 
institutions exhibiting greater impact on savings groups’ behavior, which can assist 
stakeholders in identifying partners for sustainably promoting savings groups in emerging 
economies. Moreover, the benefits that savings groups obtain from having a linkage with 
a formal financial institution may depend on specific savings groups’ characteristics like 
asset size. Future research could investigate the SG-specific characteristics that ensure that 
groups reap full benefits from their relationships with formal financial institutions. This 
will offer better policy guidance. 
Finally, from this study we do not know the mechanisms through which financial linkage 
impacts social capital among group members. Social capital is a main building block for 
the success of informal financial mechanisms (Oraro & Wyss, 2018) and understanding 
how this is affected by financial linkage is important for promoters of savings groups. 
Future studies could aim at exploring the ways through which having a relationship with a 
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Financial education at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Is there an effect 
on the performance of informal grassroots financial associations?* 
Abstract 
Financial education has become a global policy recommendation for reducing negative 
economic behavior resulting from financial illiteracy. We investigate the effect of financial 
education tailored to benefit individual participants and delivered through informal 
grassroots financial associations. While research on the effects of financial education 
normally focuses on possible individual benefits, we focus on possible effects at both the 
individual and group levels. Using a large, matched sample of data on 2,364 savings groups 
from 9 African countries, results obtained from random effects regression analysis show 
that on an individual level, the savings per member increase. At the group level, the fund 
utilization rate and return on savings increase, suggesting that the groups become more 
active in leveraging the members’ savings in order to generate welfare for the members. 
The study highlights that exploiting teachable moments, coupled with peer learning that 
takes place in the savings group context, offers a good alternative channel for delivery of 
financial education. 
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In this paper, we investigate from a new angle the effect of financial education on people 
at the bottom of the pyramid (BOP). Using a unique setting and delivery channel, i.e., 
informal savings groups, we build on previous studies that recognize that traditional 
classroom-based financial education does not yield substantial changes in adult financial 
behavior (Carpena, Cole, Shapiro, & Zia, 2019; Fernandes, Lynch, & Netemeyer, 2014; 
Collins, 2013). Our unique setting allows us not only to assess the effect of non-classroom-
based financial education, but also to evaluate financial education outcomes at both the 
individual and group levels. 
Financial literacy is very low in most low-income countries (Xu & Zia, 2012). For example, 
according to Standards & Poor’s financial literacy survey, the percentage of people in 
Africa who are financially literate is generally below 50% (Klapper, Lusardi, & Van 
Oudheusden, 2015). Such low levels of financial literacy have significant implications on 
how people make financial decisions, which ultimately affects economic outcomes. To 
mitigate the negative consequences of low levels of financial literacy, vast effort has been 
devoted to the design of financial education interventions aimed at the BOP populations. 
An example is the global financial education program created by Microfinance 
Opportunities and Freedom from Hunger with support from the Citi Foundation. 
Additionally, several governments like Uganda and Rwanda have, in their national 
financial education strategies, specific priorities aimed at low-income earners, especially 
rural dwellers who are excluded from the formal financial sector (Bank of Uganda, 2013). 
There is a vast literature on the effect of financial education on financial behavior in both 
the developed world (Bernheim & Garrett, 2003; Lusardi, 2008) and the developing world 
(Cole, Sampson, & Zia, 2011). However, scholars are still struggling to clearly identify the 
positive effects of financial education on individuals who have undergone financial 
education (Fernandes et al., 2014). Some scholars attribute this lack of positive results to 
the ineffectiveness of the traditional classroom-based channel. For example, Carpena et al. 
(2019) find that stand-alone classroom-based financial education has no effect on the 
financial behavior of urban poor households in Ahmedabad, India. Similarly, in his 
investigation of the effects of mandatory financial education offered to very low-income 




Fernandes et al. (2014) conclude from their meta-analysis that traditional classroom-based 
financial education has no effect on financial behavior. Given the weight of this evidence, 
there is a call for more innovative ways of designing and delivering financial education 
(The World Bank, 2017).  
Recently, there has been a growing literature that seeks to understand alternative delivery 
channels for financial education and their effectiveness. One stream of literature studies 
mass media channels like televised series and how they can be used to deliver financial 
education to a large population (e.g., Berg & Zia, 2017; Spader, Ratcliffe, Montoya, & 
Skillern, 2009). Another stream of literature focuses on the timing of the delivery of 
financial education and how this influences behavioral change in the recipients of the 
financial education (e.g., Doi, McKenzie, & Zia, 2014). Notably, Bhutoria and Vignoles 
(2018) investigate financial education interventions delivered to women in Indian self-help 
groups and find positive effects on personal saving and budgeting behavior. However, in 
addition to narrowly focusing on a single individual-level outcome, namely, personal 
savings, these authors investigated an intervention in a controlled setting over a one-day 
period. Thus, although their study provides initial evidence on financial education offered 
through informal savings associations, it does so for a brief one-day period and does not 
provide evidence on the effects of a long-term intervention. 
In this study, we investigate the effectiveness of financial education delivered through 
informal grassroots financial groups - savings groups (SGs). Savings groups are member-
owned institutions that are comprised of 15–30 self-selected members who pool money in 
a common fund and borrow from the fund at an interest (Le Polain, Sterck, & Nyssens, 
2018). In Sub-Saharan Africa, these community-based financial institutions are in practice 
the most common financial system available, particularly in rural areas (Ledgerwood, 
Earne, & Nelson, 2013). This informal banking model has been around for centuries and 
commonly more than 50% of adult villagers participate in a savings group (Bouman, 1995). 
Savings groups provide people with a safe place to save and borrow money. Although the 
vast majority of savings groups spring up spontaneously without any form of facilitation 
from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), Le Polain et al. (2018) report that 
facilitated savings groups in Africa have more than nine million members. In addition to 
offering members a basic informal banking system, savings groups have sufficient 




Savings groups meet regularly, often weekly. These meetings offer “teachable moments” 
as group members can immediately put into practice what is delivered through the 
intervention (Kaiser & Menkhoff, 2017; Doi et al., 2014). Offering financial education in 
a traditional classroom-based format may not yield the desired results as participants 
cannot immediately apply their knowledge. By contrast, in a savings group context, in 
which financial education complements the core group activities of saving and borrowing, 
group members can immediately use the acquired knowledge in their regular group 
transactions. Additionally, the peer component in the savings group’s methodology offers 
group members an environment in which they can learn from each other and reinforce the 
acquired knowledge through peer monitoring (Cassidy & Fafchamps, 2020; Sarkar & 
Singh, 2006). In this paper, we exploit the uniqueness of savings groups to address the 
question of whether financial education affects the financial behavior of the group 
members. 
To answer this question, we use matched sample data from the Savings Group Information 
Exchange (SAVIX). The data covers 2,364 savings groups from 9 African countries for the 
period 2010 to 2017. We use coarsened exact matching to obtain the matched sample of 
data for SGs with and without financial education, which is then analyzed using random 
effects generalized least squares regression techniques. We draw on three complementary 
measures to assess financial education outcomes at the individual level as well as at the 
group level. The individual-level measure, namely, savings per member, captures the 
savings capacity of the group members. These savings are an input that is converted into 
loans to group members at an interest. The group-level measures are the fund utilization 
rate and return on savings. The fund utilization rate, i.e., the share of available funds that 
are lent out to the members, captures the efficiency with which member savings are 
converted into loans while the return on savings measures group profitability, i.e., the 
wealth created for group members from the available savings. 
Comparing savings groups with and without financial education allows us to demonstrate 
that financial education improves financial behavior at both the individual and group levels. 
Specifically, financial education is consistently associated with higher savings per member, 
a higher fund utilization rate, and a higher return on savings, and the effect is substantial 
in economic terms. Thus, the findings suggest that, indeed, savings groups provide a viable 




the benefits of financial education as savings per member increase in SGs with financial 
education. At the group level, we see groups becoming more active and efficient in terms 
of increased lending/borrowing activity, as captured by the fund utilization rate. Further, 
as more savings are lent out at interest, more welfare is created for group members, as 
captured by the increased return on savings. Thus, savings groups that receive financial 
education are able to leverage the members’ savings to yield benefits that are enjoyed at 
both the individual and group levels. 
The paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we contribute to the growing 
literature that seeks to understand how the manner and the timing of the delivery of 
financial education can impact its effectiveness. We investigate financial education 
delivered in an informal savings group setting, with a peer monitoring component, that 
provides members with an immediate opportunity to implement the acquired knowledge. 
Second, we broaden the scope of the literature on the effects of financial education on 
economic behavior by showing how financial education tailored to the individual yields 
benefits that trickle up to the group level. Third, the paper contributes to the study of 
integrated development programs, specifically the integration of microfinance and other 
development initiatives (Lensink, Mersland, Vu, & Zamore, 2018), by looking at the 
complementarity between financial education and savings groups.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history of savings 
groups and reviews the relevant literature. Section 3 describes the data and the empirical 
strategy adopted in the paper. Section 4 presents the empirical results and Section 5 
concludes. 
2. Relevant literature 
2.1 Background on savings groups 
The bottom of the pyramid (BOP) comprises the largest but poorest segment of the world’s 
population. It is characterized by people who subsist on less than 2.50 USD per day 
(Prahalad, 2005), often living in urban slums or hard to reach rural areas and having low 
levels of education. The BOP is further characterized by a large informal sector. Several 




include initiatives by national governments, non-governmental organizations, donor 
agencies, and formal financial institutions. For example, the Global Financial Education 
Program, an initiative launched by two not-for-profit organizations (Microfinance 
Opportunities and Freedom from Hunger), provides financial education to BOP 
populations, and Aflatoun, an international NGO, provides school-based financial 
education to BOP youths (Supanantaroek, Lensink, & Hansen, 2017; Berry, Karlan, & 
Pradhan, 2018). Some interventions have been devised to deliver financial education 
through radio and television programs. For example, Scandal, a popular soap opera on debt 
management, was aired on television in South Africa (Berg & Zia, 2017), and 
Contracorriente (against the flow) a television series aimed at spreading information on 
money management and saving, was sponsored by Banco ADOPEM in the Dominican 
Repubic (Garcia, Grifoni, Lopez, & Mejía, 2013). In addition, banking regulators are 
increasingly demanding that banks financially educate their clients. For example, banks in 
Ecuador are obligated by law to provide financial education to their clients and other 
interested parties (Superintendencia de Bancos Ecuador, 2019).  
At the forefront of financial education at the BOP are community-embedded organizations 
such as savings groups (SGs). Savings groups are member-owned institutions that are 
comprised of 15–30 self-selected members who pool money in a common fund and borrow 
from the fund at an interest (Le Polain et al., 2018). The basic savings group model is built 
upon the indigenous Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and, more 
specifically, the Accumulated Savings and Credit Associations (ASCAs) that have been in 
existence for centuries (Odell, 2011; Cameron & Ananga, 2015; Beaman, Karlan & 
Thuysbaert, 2014). Unlike ROSCAs and ASCAs, savings groups are usually supported by 
a non-governmental organization, referred to as a facilitating agency, that mobilizes, trains, 
and monitors members in the initial phase of a new group. The first facilitated savings 
groups were formed in Niger by CARE International in the 1990s. Since then, several 
facilitating agencies have designed various savings group models based on CARE’s 
Village Savings and Loan Association (VSLA) model. Today major international 
development organizations like Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam, Freedom from Hunger, 
Plan International, World Vision, and the Agha Khan Foundation all consider the 
establishment of different types of savings groups to be a core objective in their strategy to 




Members of SGs contribute savings to a common pool from which they can take out loans 
to meet their various needs. Funds are kept in a metal cash box normally secured with three 
locks (Burlando & Canidio, 2017). The keys to the cash box are kept by three different 
people for safety purposes (Cassidy & Fafchamps, 2020). The cash box is opened only 
during group meetings, so that all transactions take place with full transparency. Together 
with the regular savings and loan fund, some groups maintain a smaller welfare fund for 
emergency use. Savings groups operate according to a cycle system where at the end of 
each cycle, all contents of the cashbox are distributed to the members. Upon completing a 
cycle nearly all groups initiate a new cycle.  
2.2 Financial education and financial behavior 
According to the OECD, financial education is “the process by which financial 
consumers/investors improve their understanding of financial products, concepts, and risks 
and, through information, instruction and/or objective advice, develop the skills and 
confidence to become more aware of financial risks and opportunities, to make informed 
choices, to know where to go for help, and to take other effective actions to improve their 
financial well-being” (OECD, 2005). Put simply, “financial education refers to the set of 
skills and knowledge that allow individuals to plan and manage their money” (Catholic 
Relief Services, 2013, p. ix). 
Financial education thus aims at equipping group members with the knowledge and skills 
required to make informed financial decisions especially with respect to household and 
business expenses. It covers a broad range of topics including setting savings goals, making 
borrowing decisions, budgeting, making investment decisions, understanding, and 
managing risk, and planning for retiremement (iSAVE, 2014; Genesis Analytics, 2013). In 
a savings group context, financial education is typically delivered in training modules that 
are held during regular group meetings and usually scheduled in such a way that they 
coincide with the activities that take place at a given time during the group cycle (Catholic 
Relief Services, 2013). The initial module generally focuses on conveying a general 
understanding of income and expenses, setting financial goals, and budgeting. Modules 
that take place at the beginning of the cycle, when the group is building up its common 




have accumulated and the group has started giving out loans to group members, may 
discuss loan-related topics.  
It is important to highlight the difference between savings groups that receive financial 
education and those that do not. Savings groups that do not receive financial education do 
not address the above-noted topics and teach their members only the core group activities 
of saving and borrowing. Specifically, savings groups that do not receive financial 
education teach basic financial literacy, such as numeracy skills, that is meant to assist 
members in saving and borrowing from the common fund. By contrast, savings groups that 
receive financial education aim to foster good saving and borrowing habits, impart a 
knowledge of saving and borrowing options, teach budgeting and goal-setting skills, and 
more. The “theory of change” in financial education research assumes a causal chain such 
that financial education increases financial literacy, which in turn improves financial 
behavior (Alsemgeest, 2015; Sayinzoga, Bulte, & Lensink, 2016).  
How might financial education in a savings group context influence financial behavior? 
First, savings groups are mutual associations that are highly driven by peer pressure (Breza 
& Chandrasekhar, 2019). In such a setting, members who are learning to make financial 
plans in the financial education modules may be motivated by the example of other group 
members to follow through on their plans (Kast, Meier, & Pomeranz, 2018). Moreover, 
given the presence of peer monitoring among group members especially during group 
meetings, members have an opportunity to regularly remind each other about their financial 
education, thereby motivating and strengthening each other to make better financial 
decisions.  
Second, savings groups are usually comprised of people who have prior knowledge about 
each other, belong to similar social settings, and share common social norms. When group 
members internalize the way decisions are made at the group level, they may be led to 
behave the same way when making decisions at the individual level (Ambuehl, Bernheim, 
Ersoy, & Harris, 2018). Hence, the behavior of the individual conforms to the behavior of 
society at large (Dolan et al., 2012). In particular, one’s personal financial behavior aligns 
with normative social behavior. Additionally, given the high levels of illiteracy among 
populations that belong to savings groups, it may be hard for members of these populations 




however, provide a conducive environment for social learning to take place. In particular, 
group members may be motivated to change their financial behavior when they observe 
other group members who have done so (Bursztyn, Ederer, Ferman, & Yuchtman, 2014; 
Battaglini, Bénabou, & Tirole, 2005).  
Third, savings groups provide “teachable moments”; that is to say, they provide members 
with “the possibility to apply their knowledge in a concrete case of interest to them” (Kaiser 
& Menkhoff, 2017). When savings groups receive financial education, members have the 
opportunity to immediately put into practice the acquired knowledge during their regular 
group activities of saving and borrowing (Miller, Reichelstein, Salas, & Zia, 2015). 
Moreover, the financial education training modules are often scheduled in such a way that 
they coincide with the group activity that is taking place during that time in the cycle. For 
example, when the group is starting to build up the common fund at the beginning of the 
cycle, modules on making savings plans, comparing savings services, and developing 
savings habits are offered at such a time. This provides knowledge at the very time when 
it can be utilized to make financial decisions. Thus, savings groups provide the framework 
in which people can effectively practice the acquired knowledge. In sum, compared to 
offering financial education at the individual level, savings groups provide greater stimulus 
and opportunity for people to actuate the knowledge acquired, as discussed above. 
There is a vast body of literature on the impact that financial education in the developed 
world has on economic outcomes like savings rates and borrowing rates. However, the 
evidence is still mixed (Bernheim & Garrett, 2003; Lusardi, 2008; Lusardi & Mitchell, 
2007; Collins & O’Rourke, 2010). Some scholars find that financial education positively 
influences consumer behavior, e.g., in terms of higher savings rates, lower expenditures, 
improved budgeting, and improved retirement planning. However, other scholars find no 
impact of financial education on financial behavior (Servon & Kaestner, 2008). 
The evidence pertaining to the developing world is also inconclusive. For example, Field, 
Jayachandran, & Pande (2010) find that among women employed in the informal sector in 
India, financial education has no effect on savings rates, but increases borrowing rates. 
Eissa, Habyarimana, & Jack (2013) find that financial education delivered through cartoons 
on different media outlets in Kenya yielded no significant impacts on savings rates. 




parenting intervention in South Africa improved financial behavior in terms of higher 
saving and lower borrowing rates. They attribute these improvements to improved self-
efficacy and increased levels of moral support as the program is embedded in a wider 
society intervention. Other studies have focused on financial education aimed at children 
and young adults. For example, Jamison, Karlan, & Zinman (2014) find that a youth-
focused financial literacy program in Uganda had positive benefits in terms of saving rates 
but no effect on borrowing rates. Supanantaroek et al. (2017) focused on primary school 
children and found some evidence of increased saving rates. 
Despite the fact that savings groups now form an integral part of the delivery of financial 
education to a large number of people, little is known about the effectiveness of these 
inteventions. There are two studies worth mentioning in this regard. Bhutoria & Vignoles 
(2018) examine the effectiveness of a financial education program among 78 self-help 
groups with 1,281 female members in India. Through a randomized control trial, 41 of 
these groups were exposed to a “rule of thumb” one-day financial education intervention. 
The results show positive effects in terms of personal savings, financial knowledge, and 
budgeting. Allen & Guevara (2019) evaluate the effectiveness of financial education 
delivered by Catholic Relief Services through their savings and internal lending 
communities in Latin America. Using responses from member self-evaluations to rate 
financial knowledge and behavior before and after the intervention, the authors find that 
financial education improved members’ financial knowledge and behavior. 
Although the two above-noted studies investigate the effectiveness of financial education 
in the context of savings groups, our study of the same differs from them in that it covers 
a large number of groups mobilized by many different facilitating agencies and operating 
in several countries. Moreover, it goes beyond looking at only savings. We look at three 
dimensions that represent a holistic picture of the performance of savings groups, namely, 
savings per member, fund utilization rate, and return on savings. By looking beyond 
member savings to fund utilization rate and return on savings, we go beyond evaluating 
the effectiveness of financial education at the individual level and show how through 
training aimed at the individuals, the member savings are leveraged to achieve benefits at 






We have access to data from the Savings Group Information Exchange (SAVIX).11 The 
SAVIX contains global data on over 214,000 savings groups. The data is uploaded to the 
database on a quarterly basis by field officers who make regular monitoring visits to the 
savings groups. Indeed, one of the strengths of the SAVIX is that the data is not reported 
by the group itself but by a more advanced independent authority. The SAVIX collects the 
data on metrics such as group composition, group dynamics, and group performance. 
However, given the informal nature of savings groups, it is often difficult to acquire 
comprehensive data on them. As a result, the SAVIX is subject to certain limitations; for 
example, it often does not cover groups that form spontaneously or that are not supported 
by any facilitating agency. Be that as it may, the SAVIX is currently the most representative 
database for reporting on savings groups. 
The sample for this study covers 2,364 savings groups from 9 African countries for the 
period 2010 to 2017. In constructing this sample, we first considered only savings groups 
that received financial education. We realized that the savings groups that received 
financial education were primarily located in Africa, and therefore we limited the sample 
to African countries. We then considered savings groups that did not receive financial 
education, and for comparability reasons we limited the sample to those that had the same 
facilitating agencies as the savings groups that received financial education.  
In addition to the SG-specific data from the SAVIX, we obtain country-level data from 
multiple sources. Data on population density for the different countries in our sample is 
obtained from the World Development Indicators developed by the World Bank, data on 
inflation is obtained from the World Economic Outlook database maintained by the 
International Monetary Fund, and the Economic Freedom Index is obtained from the 
Heritage Foundation. 
 




3.2 Variable definitions 
As our dependent variables, we measure financial behavioral outcomes using three 
complementary dimensions of SG performance, namely, savings per member per week, 
fund utilization rate, and return on savings (ROS) (Allen & Panetta, 2010; Ledgerwood et 
al., 2013; Lowicki-Zucca, Walugembe, Ogaba, & Langol, 2014; Burlando, Canidio, & 
Selby, 2016; Burlando & Canidio, 2017). Given the operational model of savings groups, 
these three variables cover the core elements of savings groups operations. Savings per 
member represents the savings capacity of the group members. Fund utilization rate and 
ROS cover the profit-generating capacity of the group. The fund utilization rate measures 
how actively savings are converted into loans. It is not optimal for a savings group to leave 
funds dormant in the group’s cash box as such funds do not earn interest and instead pose 
a security threat. Hence, a high fund utilization rate is good for the group. The ROS 
measures group profitability and captures the wealth created for group members. The 
savings are lent out at interest, earning returns for the group members. This profit is usually 
shared among group members at the end of the cycle. 
Our independent variable, financial education, is measured using a dummy variable that 
takes a value of 1 if the savings group received financial education beyond basic education 
in the core group activities of saving and borrowing and 0 otherwise. It should be noted 
that facilitating agencies customize their financial education curricula and therefore the 
financial education modules offered may vary by facilitating agency.  Due to data 
limitations, the dummy variable does not capture differences in financial education 
between facilitating agencies. Exploring such differences would be a fruitful avenue for 
future research. 
We include a number of SG-specific control variables, namely, age, group size, welfare 
fund, asset size, other development initiatives, rural location, and facilitating agency. Older 
groups are more likely to have higher performance owing to the learning effect that takes 
place during the lifetime of the group. Larger groups may have lower performance as they 
are harder to manage and prone to internal conflicts and free-rider problems (Cuevas & 
Schrieder, 1991; Sharma & Zeller, 1997). In addition to the group’s main cash fund, some 
groups keep a welfare fund that acts as an informal insurance mechanism that is normally 
used by group members when faced with an emergency. Keeping a welfare fund can have 




We also control for the asset size of the group as groups with higher assets are more likely 
to achieve higher performance. SGs normally integrate other development initiatives 
besides financial education, commonly referred to as “add-ons.” For example, together 
with financial education, a savings group may receive health education and women’s 
empowerment instruction. Hence, to estimate the true effect of financial education, we 
include a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the group has integrated other 
development initiatives and 0 otherwise. The rural location dummy accounts for 
differences that may occur between SGs located in the rural areas and those located in 
urban areas. SGs located in urban areas may have access to more resources and hence 
achieve higher performance. SGs are also usually supported by different Non-
Governmental Organizations commonly referred to as facilitating agencies. These agencies 
are charged with the responsibility of educating communities in the groups’ core activities 
of saving and borrowing and also assisting in group formation. Due to the different 
operational models and priorities of these agencies, we argue that different agencies can 
influence the performance of the groups in different ways. We account for this by 
controlling for the facilitating agency in our regressions.  
Finally, we include three macroeconomic variables that account for the differences in the 
macroeconomic conditions faced by the SGs in our sample. These include population 
density, economic freedom index, and inflation. Meeting attendance is crucial for the 
operation of a savings group as all transactions take place during the regular meetings. 
Especially in areas where the population is sparsely populated, it may be time-consuming 
and costly for members to convene regularly and poor attendance may affect group 
activities and ultimately performance (Gonzales Martinez, 2019; Christensen, 1993). The 
inflation rate in a country may have an impact on the way members conduct saving and 
borrowing activities (Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel & Servén, (2000). Economic freedom index 
measures the degree of economic liberalization in the countries in which the SGs are 
located and may have an effect on citizens’ participation in economic activities, both 
formal and informal. A list of all the variables and their definitions is provided in Table 1. 
3.3 Estimation strategy 
In our empirical analysis, we note that there may be endogeneity concerns as SGs do not 




education largely depends on the facilitating agency. We further note that there may be 
selection bias concerns as some savings groups requested financial education from the 
facilitating agency. Consequently, there may be systematic differences in the groups that 
have financial education and those that do not. The results obtained from analyzing such a 
sample of SGs may reflect these systematic differences rather than the effect of financial 
education. To mitigate this possibility, we use matching methods as a data pre-processing 
strategy to acquire a sample of SGs that are as similar as possible along various matching 
covariates. Matching can be applied when one has a treatment, a group of treated units, and 
a group of untreated units, where the latter serve as control units (Caliendo & Kopeinig, 
2008). In this study, the treatment is financial education. The savings groups that received 
financial education serve as the treated units and those that did not receive financial 
education serve as the control units. The goal of the matching is to derive from the control 
pool a group of savings groups that did not receive financial education that are as similar 
as possible to those that received financial education along several observable 
characteristics. 
We use coarsened exact matching (CEM) as our matching algorithm. CEM starts by 
coarsening the data so that groups with similar characteristics are grouped together. The 
exact matching algorithm is then applied to the coarsened data to obtain the matched data 
and unmatched units are discarded (Iacus, King, & Porro, 2011, 2012). We choose 
matching covariates based on theoretical reasoning and information on the operation and 
institutional setting of SGs (Caliendo & Kopeining, 2008). We include as covariates mainly 
time-invariant variables that either influence the decision to offer financial education or 
our performance measures (Stuart, 2010). The matching covariates are the share of women 
in the group, the age of the group, the rural dummy, indicator variables for the facilitating 
agencies that support the SGs, and other development initiatives. The matching is carried 
out on data that has been averaged at the group level. After the matching, the data is 
decompressed back to the panel structure. To check the quality of our matching solution, 
we employ the multivariate L1 distance statistic (Iacus et al., 2012). The L1 distance before 
matching is 0.93 and after matching is 0.38, which shows that the matching considerably 
increases the balance between the treated and untreated SGs. The final matched sample of 
data contains data on 1,182 SGs with financial education and a similar number of SGs 




sample of data. We regress the performance measures on the financial education dummy 
and control for several SG-specific and contextual factors. We include cycle dummies and 
time dummies in the different regressions to account for cycle and time fixed effects, 
respectively.  
3.4 Descriptive statistics  
Table 1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the study. We see that SGs 
with financial education constitute 64% of the sample data. With regard to the performance 
measures, we see that in the average group, members save about 2.27 USD per week with 
a maximum value of 21.3 USD. The small values of the savings per member indicate that 
savings groups really serve the bottom of the pyramid market. The fund utilization rate of 
the average group is 73.6%, which indicates that more than half of the savings are 
converted into loans for the group members that need credit. The average group has a return 
on savings of 51.7%. The return on savings represents the profits earned on member 
savings and a value of 51.7% shows that savings are lent out at high interest rate levels. In 
fact, annualized interest rates on loans in SGs are commonly above 50% (Le Polain et al., 
2018; Rasmussen, 2012).  
Furthermore, as we see from the SG characteristics, the average SG has an asset size of 
1,443 USD, has been in operation for 401 days (approximately 13 months), has 22 active 
members, and is composed of 91% women. About 80% of savings groups keep a welfare 
fund that can be used by group members when faced with an emergency and 12% of the 
groups are located in rural areas. In terms of group facilitation, a majority of the SGs in our 
sample are supported by Plan International (68%), followed by SaveAct (27%). The 
remaining 5% comprise SGs supported by CARE and SGs with no facilitating agency. We 
also note that in addition to financial education, 69% of the groups also offer other add-on 
services. Finally, the macroeconomic indicators show that the average country has a 
population density of 5 people per square kilometer, an economic freedom index score of 
95%, and an inflation rate of 60%. 
Table 2 presents a correlation matrix for the independent variables in our study. A visual 
inspection of the correlation coefficients reveals that multi-collinearity is not a concern. 




0.552 between inflation and economic freedom. This is also below the threshold 0.9 




Table 1: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable          Definition Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. 
Independent variable             
Financial Education 1 if the group received financial education  4,785 0.636 0.481 0 1 
Financial Performance             
Savings per member   Savings per member per week in US$ 4,785 2.269 3.118 0.093 21.346 
Savings per member to GNI per 
capita 
Savings per member per week relative to GNI per 
capita adjusted for PPP (in dollars per 1,000 
dollars GNI per capita) 4,785 1.422 1.492 0.007 6.064 
Fund utilization rate 
Value of loans outstanding/value of member 
savings 4,785 0.736 0.506 0 1.669 
ROS Return on savings 4,785 0.517 0.527 -0.920 3.017 
SG Characteristics             
Age The age of the group in days 4,785 401.361 302.304 17 1974 
Asset size The total assets of the group 4,785 1442.749 1467.555 17.334 6521.443 
Ln(Asset size) The natural logarithm of total assets 4,785 6.733 1.174 2.853 8.783 
Group size Number of active members in the group 4,785 22.281 5.625 7 47 
Womenperc Percentage of women in the group 4,785 91.078 13.725 0 100 
Welfare fund 1 if the group keeps an emergency fund 4,785 0.799 0.401 0 1 
Other “add-ons” 1 if the group integrates other development 
initiatives 4,785 0.685 0.464 0 1 
Rural location 1 if the group is located in a rural area 4,785 0.120 0.325 0 1 
Facilitating Agency             
CARE 1 if the group is supported by CARE 4,785 0.037 0.189 0 1 
No facilitating agency 1 if the group has no facilitating agency 4,785 0.017 0.129 0 1 
Plan International 1 if the group is supported by Plan International 4,785 0.680 0.466 0 1 
SaveAct 1 if the group is supported by SaveAct 4,785 0.266 0.442 0 1 
Macro indicator             
Population density People per square km of land area 4,785 5.018 5.819 -1.083 19.241 
Economic freedom 
The heritage index of the country in which the SG 
is located 4,785 95.232 70.554 20.079 460.846 




Table 2: Correlation matrix 
 No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financial Education 1 1.000          
Age 2 -0.021 1.000         
Asset size 3 -0.067 0.312 1.000        
Group size 4 0.149 0.123 0.219 1.000       
Other "add-ons 5 0.330 0.052 -0.263 0.277 1.000      
Welfare fund 6 0.356 -0.027 -0.145 0.175 0.528 1.000     
Rural location 7 -0.096 -0.003 -0.168 -0.024 0.003 0.075 1.000    
Population density 8 -0.052 0.066 -0.100 0.267 0.338 0.283 0.414 1.000   
Economic freedom 9 0.083 0.152 0.241 -0.010 -0.332 -0.196 -0.106 0.234 1.000  





4. Results and discussion 
Table 3 presents our random effects regression results for the effect of financial 
education on the performance of SGs measured in terms of savings per member, 
fund utilization rate, and return on savings. The model statistics, i.e., the Wald χ2, 
are statistically significant for all our models and the R-squared values show that 
our independent variables explain between 34% and 37% of the change in the 
performance measures.  
Table 3: Financial education and performance of SGs. 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables Savings per 
member 
Fund utilization rate ROS 
Financial Education 0.602*** 0.198*** 0.085*** 
 (0.200) (0.024) (0.027) 
Age -0.004*** -0.000*** 0.000*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Asset size 0.287*** 0.025*** 0.253*** 
 (0.057) (0.008) (0.008) 
Group size -0.029*** 0.010*** -0.013*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) 
Other “add-ons 0.186 -0.306*** -0.072 
 (0.587) (0.083) (0.079) 
Welfare fund 0.014 0.029 0.019 
 (0.157) (0.025) (0.025) 
Rural location 1.553*** 0.540*** 0.176*** 
 (0.253) (0.034) (0.035) 
Population density -0.003** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
Economic freedom 0.163*** 0.037*** 0.007 
 (0.041) (0.006) (0.007) 
Inflation -0.013 -0.023*** -0.024*** 
 (0.011) (0.002) (0.003) 
    
Agency dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Cycle fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes 
    
Observations 4,785 4,785 4,785 
R-squared 0.3685 0.3358 0.3441 
Number of SGs 2,364 2,364 2,364 
Table 3 shows the results for the relationship between financial education and SG performance (measured 
by the savings per member, fund utilization rate and return on savings). Refer to table 1 for the definition 
of the variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% 





Looking at column 1, we see that financial education has a positive and statistically 
significant impact on savings per member. The finding is consistent when savings 
per member is scaled by GNI per capita. This finding is similar to several studies 
that find a positive impact of financial education on saving rates in developing 
country settings (Bhutoria & Vignoles, 2018; Jamison et al., 2014). The result 
shows that savings per member per week for groups that receive financial 
education is, on average, 0.6 USD cents higher. This corresponds to an increase in 
savings per member to 2.87 USD for SGs with financial education compared to an 
average of 2.27 USD in the entire sample. Additionally, since the average group is 
composed of 22 members, this shows that the economic effect of financial 
education is around 13 USD more savings on average. We argue that there are two 
potential mechanisms driving the observed results. First, savings groups offer 
“teachable moments.” Savings groups provide members with an immediate 
opportunity to put into practice the knowledge they acquire. In particular, group 
members can translate the acquired knowledge into behavior using their increased 
savings amounts. Wagh (2017) notes that offering timely financial education, i.e., 
so that it coincides with the time at which people make financial decisions, may 
achieve results as people are less likely to forget the acquired knowledge. Second, 
through peer pressure, financial education offered through savings groups may 
influence members’ behavior. When financial education is offered in the context 
of savings groups, there is peer monitoring that may motivate members to 
demonstrate their ability to utilize the knowledge received. 
In column 2, performance is measured in terms of the fund utilization rate. The 
fund utilization rate represents the rate at which SGs convert savings into loans. A 
high fund utilization rate is good for SGs as this means that funds are efficiently 
being lent out and earning an interest that will be shared out to group members at 
the end of the cycle. We observe a positive and statistically significant relationship 
between financial education and fund utilization rate. SGs that with financial 
education have a significantly higher fund utilization rate compared to those with 
no financial education. Specifically, the estimated coefficient of 0.198 implies that 
the fund utilization rate for SGs that have financial education is, on average, 19.8 
percentage points higher. On average, we have a fund utilization rate of 73.6% in 
the entire sample, which shows that the fund utilization rate for SGs with financial 
education increases to 93.4%, which means that the largest percentage (93.4%) of 




funds are left lying unproductive in the cash box in SGs with financial education 
compared to 26.4% in the entire sample. This suggests that SGs with financial 
education are more active in terms of converting members’ savings into loans than 
their counterparts with no financial education. Moreover, an increase in the fund 
utilization rate reflects an increase in the borrowing rate. This is consistent with 
Sayinzoga et al. (2016) who find that financial education induced farmers to take 
out loans. The increase in borrowing could stem from the fact that financial 
education increases people’s understanding of how to select investments and 
manage loans and hence their confidence in loan acquisition. This confidence can 
be seen to trickle up to the group level as the groups take on more risk by lending 
out higher shares of the common fund. 
Furthermore, the results in column 3 show a positive and statistically significant 
relation between financial education and return on savings. This finding is 
consistent even when we use the annualized return on savings.12 SGs with financial 
education have a return on savings that is on average 8.5 percentage points higher 
than SGs without financial education. Compared to the average return on savings 
of 51.7% in the entire sample, savings groups with financial education have a 
return on savings of 60.2%. The positive results on the fund utilization rate and the 
return on savings show that the benefits of financial education are enjoyed not only 
at the individual level, i.e., through the higher savings per member, but also at the 
group level, i.e., through the increased welfare created for the savings group. With 
financial education, the members’ small individual savings are leveraged to 
generate higher benefits for the group as a whole. With a higher fund utilization 
 
12 The ROS and the annualized ROS both measure profitability but with the annualized ROS, one has to 
extrapolate the observed profits and savings measured at a point in time over the group cycle. The ROS we 
apply, however, captures the profits and savings at the same point in time, i.e., the ROS is calculated as 
profits generated at a point in time divided by the average savings at the same point in time. SGs operate in 
such a way that at the beginning of the cycle, the only activity that takes place is saving. When funds have 
accumulated, the borrowing activity starts. Moreover, also towards the end of the cycle, the borrowing 
activity stops. This shows that saving and borrowing activity varies over the cycle and annualization may 
introduce noise in the ROS measure. By annualizing ROS, you assume that the “percentage-point returns” 
earned on your savings so far, will continue to grow at the same rate throughout the cycle. Given the 
‘unproductive periods’ we observe notably at the beginning and end of the cycle and given the profit-figures 
we univariately observe both across and within the cycle, we consider this ‘linear-growth assumption’ fairly 
unrealistic. We do not argue that one measure is better than the other and, in unreported results, we use the 





rate, members’ savings are not left dormant in the group’s cash box but are lent 
out and fetch a return that is later shared out to all group members at the end of the 
cycle. This shows how financial education aimed at individuals yields benefits that 
trickle up to the group level. 
Looking at the control variables, some results are worth mentioning. We observe 
that the asset size and rural dummies have a significant impact on all three 
performance measures. Specifically, we see that asset size significantly enhances 
group performance. Also, the rural dummy has a positive effect on all three 
performance measures. This means that SGs located in rural areas have higher 
performance, which may be due to the fact that access to financial services is 
limited in such areas and hence rural populations take greater advantage of the 
available savings groups. The observed effects on the economic freedom index 
(positive effect) and inflation (negative effect) suggest that SGs thrive in countries 
with more favorable macroeconomic conditions.  
5. Conclusion 
There is widespread recognition that traditional classroom-based financial 
education is to a large extent ineffective. Moreover, most research efforts have 
focused on investigating effects of financial education at the individual level. 
Using a unique setting, we investigate financial education delivered through an 
innovative channel, savings groups. In so doing, we shed light on the unique 
characteristics of these groups that make them suitable to reach people at the 
bottom of the pyramid and spur successful changes in financial behavior. We also 
show that there is a trickle-up effect as training aimed at individuals yields benefits 
at the group level. We run random effects regressions on a comparable matched 
sample of data on 2,364 savings groups from 9 African countries. 
Our findings reveal that savings groups with financial education have higher 
savings per member, a higher fund utilization rate, and a higher return on savings. 
Generally, the results provide evidence that financial education delivered through 
these informal grassroots financial associations indeed has an effect on the 
financial behavior of people at the bottom of the pyramid. We argue that the 
observed effects are due to the peer monitoring and social learning that take place 
in the savings group context. Additionally, exploiting teachable moments to 




education when delivered through the savings groups. Savings groups provide the 
framework in which people can put into immediate use the acquired knowledge 
during their regular group activities of saving and borrowing. Moreover, we argue 
that with financial education, group members’ ability to select investments and 
manage loans improves, their confidence in loan acquisition grows, and hence the 
fund utilization rate increases. Taken together, these findings show that financial 
education is effective not only at the individual level in terms of increased savings 
per member but also at the group level in terms of wealth generated for all group 
members. 
Generally, the study contributes to the literature by showing that savings groups 
are a viable channel through which financial education can be offered. In 
particular, the study demonstrates the effectiveness of financial education in 
savings groups at the bottom of the pyramid. The study goes beyond looking at 
economic outcomes only at the individual level in terms of savings per member by 
considering economic outcomes also at the group level in terms of fund utilization 
rate and return on savings. The study has important implications for financial 
education projects that target members at the BOP. First, it highlights the fact that 
knowledge alone may not be sufficient for encouraging change in financial 
behavior among people at the BOP. However, education coupled with a practical 
element (savings groups in this case) provides members with the impetus to 
practice what they are being taught. Savings groups provide teachable moments 
and provide group members with a practical way to practice what they learn. 
Moreover, based on their foundation as mutual associations, savings groups that 
offer financial education act as commitment and enforcement mechanisms that 
stimulate positive behavior in members relative to other individual-based vehicles 
of financial education.  
The results also show that when evaluating the effectiveness of financial education, 
context should be taken into consideration. When one looks at the results on 
increased borrowing, one may be led to conclude that financial education has not 
been successful since in a typical setting people are taught to increase savings but 
to be cautious about borrowing. However, in the savings group context, an increase 
in borrowing is ultimately good for the group as members’ funds are not left 
dormant in the group’s cash box but are lent out and fetch an interest that is shared 




Further research could investigate the mechanisms through which financial 
education influences economic behavior. Is it the peer-monitoring mechanism 
inherent in the savings group model that is the major driver of modifying financial 
behavior or is it the practical element provided by the savings group’s model? 
Understanding the mechanisms will shed more light on how to successfully design 
financial education for people at the bottom of the pyramid. Further research could 
also investigate what mode of delivery yields the best outcome, both in terms of 
who delivers the training and how the pedagogy is structured. Additionally, this 
study does not probe the differences in the financial education curricula and 
modules offered by the different facilitating agencies. Future research should 
explore such specificities as this will offer guidance on the type of curricula that 
yields the most optimal outcomes and guide other agencies that are in the process 
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Including men in a female financial model: an analysis of 
informal grassroots financial associations* 
Abstract 
There is an increasing push among development actors to engage men in gender-
focused development efforts. This is also observed in initiatives organizing 
economically poor individuals into groups where members save and borrow 
among each other. While such savings groups were originally tailored for women, 
we now observe an upsurge of male members. Yet, little is known about how male 
engagement affects certain core elements of the savings groups model. This study 
investigates the influence of male membership on the group’s profit generating 
capacity. Further, the study aims to understand if this relationship is moderated by 
the level of gender equality in the country that the group is located. Drawing on 
random effects regression analysis on a sample of data pertaining to 81,853 savings 
groups from 30 countries, the results show that the group’s profit generating 
capacity reduces as the percentage of male members increases. Moreover, the 
results further show that gender equality of the country in which the group is 
located moderates the observed relationship.  
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For decades, women have been the focus of several development interventions 
since they were largely marginalized and victimized in the society. In areas such 
as reproductive health, gender equality, gender-based violence, intimate partner 
violence and even mainstream microfinance, emphasis was put on women. 
Increasingly, however, we are observing a shift towards engaging men in such 
interventions (See for example Subašić et al., 2018 for gender equality; Casey, 
Carlson, Two Bulls & Yager, 2018 for gender-based violence; Ruane-McAteer et 
al., 2019 for sexual and reproductive health; Flood, 2011 for men’s violence 
against women). There are increasing global efforts in this regard from major 
development actors. The United Nations for example through campaigns like the 
“HeForShe”13 campaign recognizes the role men and boys have to play to foster 
gender equality. The move towards male engagement in these different efforts 
stems from the realization that it may be difficult to achieve gender equality change 
from development efforts if the focus is entirely on women and men are excluded. 
Since marginalization of women is deeply rooted in discriminative gender norms 
inherent in several societies and men are normally the custodians of such norms, it 
is important that their role is recognized if a change is to happen. 
In this paper, I consider a large and growing development model - savings groups 
which is currently facing a similar trend of increased male focus. I investigate the 
influence of increasing male engagement on key aspects of the savings group’s 
operational model. Savings groups (SGs) are grassroots, community managed 
financial institutions where members save collectively and borrow from pooled 
savings at an interest (Le Polain, Sterck, & Nyssens, 2018). Such institutions are 
flexible and robust to different environments (Mutebi et al., 2017; Ojong, 2014) 
which makes them very popular among development actors like CARE 
International, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam, World Vision etc. as a mode to 
reach largely excluded populations. Estimates show that there are over 14 million 
members in facilitated savings groups globally (SEEP Network, 2016). At 
inception, the model had a particular emphasis on women. For example, the first 
structured savings groups model, the Village Savings and Loan Associations, 
pioneered by CARE international in Niger in the 1990s started by reaching out to 
only women. Through the Mata Masu Dubara (meaning women on the move) 
 




groups, the goal was to drive the socio-economic empowerment of women (Grant 
& Allen, 2002). Although women still make up around 80 percent of savings 
groups’ membership (Wheaton, 2019), available data shows that male membership 
is increasing overtime. In the data sample used for this study, for example, the 
share of male members increased from about 9 percent in 2010 to over 27 percent 
in 2017. However, very little is known about the influence that this increasing male 
engagement has on the SG core operational model. 
I shed light on the influence that male engagement has on savings groups.  
Specifically, I investigate the following research question: what impact does male 
membership have on the savings group’s profit generating capacity? In other 
words, I investigate whether the SG gender composition has an impact on the 
group profit generating capacity. The SG model requires efficient handling of 
savings and borrowing activities to create wealth for the group members and for 
sustainability of the groups. The group profit generating capacity is the best way 
to measure whether the group is operating efficiently. Moreover, sustainable 
groups which generate reasonable profits for group members are more likely to 
survive and continue operation into subsequent cycles which ensures continuity of 
the SG methodology but also strengthens financial inclusion efforts. Some scholars 
argue in favor of member homogeneity across certain elements within the group 
arguing that when people are similar, it is easier to enforce rules making 
transaction costs much lower in such groups (Cassidy & Fafchamps, 2020; Slover 
1991). On the contrary, heterogeneity may bring people of dissimilar interests 
together (Nagarajan, Meyer & Graham, 1999) which can affect group functioning 
and performance in general. For example, men who are usually portrayed as more 
self-interested whereas women usually tend towards collective interests 
(D'Espallier, Guerin, & Mersland, 2013; Guérin, 2011; Johnson, 2004).  
I use a novel data set covering 81,853 savings groups from 30 countries in the 
period 2010 to 2017. This data is obtained from the Savings Group Information 
Exchange (SAVIX), the first platform of its kind to have comprehensive data on 
these informal financial associations. SG profit generating capacity is measured 
using the return on savings which captures the wealth creation for the group and 
members’ individual financial outcome from group participation. The results 
indicate that as the percentage of male members in the group increases, the profit 




investigate whether the relation between gender composition and group profit 
generating capacity is influenced by the level of gender equality in the country in 
which the group is located. Countries with low levels of gender equality are usually 
characterized by discriminatory gender norms that could curtail the ability of men 
and women to interact and collaborate in groups. For example, in certain societies, 
it is even prohibited for women to interact with men especially in public spaces 
(Lata, Walters & Roitman, 2020). Indeed, the results show that gender inequality 
in the countries that these groups are located worsens the negative relation between 
gender composition and SG’s profit-generating capacity. In other words, group 
profit generating capacity suffers more as the percentage of men increases in 
countries with high inequality. 
This study is conceptually rooted in a larger body of work that investigates 
increasing male engagement in development interventions that previously focused 
on women. Several scholars have investigated male engagement albeit the effect 
of this has been mostly investigated on an individual and household level. For 
example, Slegh, Barker, Kimonyo, Ndolimana, & Bannerman (2013) studies the 
effect that engagement of male partners of savings groups members has on 
household income, care work, decision making and power dynamics. Stern, 
Pascoe, Shand & Richmond (2015) explore how engagement of males in sexual 
and reproductive health changed their attitudes towards family planning use and 
involvement in domestic duties.  I shift the unit of analysis from the individual to 
the group level. By doing so, the research contributes to a broader body of 
knowledge and guides policy on engaging men in savings groups without harming 
the core aspects of the group.  
Additionally, the paper adds to the evidence base regarding savings group 
composition by investigating the gender composition question. Burlando & 
Canidio (2017) look at the socioeconomic status of the group members and how 
this influences the amount of savings collected and the loans disbursed. Cassidy & 
Fafchamps (2020) investigate how sorting of group members along certain 
characteristics like occupation may influence the financial intermediation 
capability of savings groups.  
Further, I contribute to the literature by considering gender equality as a contextual 
variable that could influence the performance of SGs. Savings groups are usually 




therefore, crucial to understand how this influences interaction of men and women 
in groups and ultimately influences several aspects of the SG methodology.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the relevant 
literature; section 3 describes the data and the empirical strategy used in the paper. 
In section 4, the results are presented and discussed, and section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
2. Relevant literature 
2.1 Background on savings groups 
Savings groups are community-based financial institutions composed of 15-30 
members that pool money in a common fund and borrow from the fund at an 
interest (Le Polain et al., 2018; Burlando & Canidio, 2017). They are typically 
informal associations that are built on a foundation of mutual co-operation and 
trust (Cassidy & Fafchamps, 2020). The basic savings group model, the Village 
Savings & Loan Associations (VSLA), was pioneered by CARE International in 
Niger in 1990. Since then, different international Non-Government Organizations 
(NGOs) like Catholic Relief Services, Agha Khan Foundation, Oxfam, Plan 
International, Freedom From Hunger, Stromme Foundation etc. have promoted 
variants of the VSLA model. The savings group methodology has gained 
popularity among NGOs owing to its capability to reach large populations in a 
cost-effective way (Le Polain et al., 2018; Karlan, Savonitto, Thuysbaert, & Udry, 
2017). Additionally, several studies have identified various positive effects from 
savings group participation on individual and household welfare (Moret, Swann, 
& Lorenzetti, 2020; Ksoll, Lilleør, Lønborg & Rasmussen, 2016). 
These savings groups are based on traditional financial group schemes like the 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) and Accumulating Savings 
and Credit Associations (ASCAs), that have been existence for centuries (Beaman, 
Karlan, & Thuysbaert, 2014; Bouman, 1995). In ROSCAS, every member 
contributes a pre-determined amount to a common pot which is then given to one 
member of the group in turn until all members have had the opportunity to receive 
the pot (Ambec & Treich, 2007). While in ASCAs, rather than giving all the 
collected funds to one member in turn, the funds are allowed to accumulate and 




ASCAs, SGs accumulate money in a common fund and group members can take 
loans from the fund at an interest. What differentiates SGs from ASCAs is that 
groups are mobilized and trained by an external agency sponsored by an 
international NGO like CARE or Aga Khan. Thus, SGs is a facilitated financial 
model that are provided with certain guidelines and procedures that are aimed at 
enhancing the group operations and management (Ledgerwood, Earne & Nelson, 
2013).14  
These guidelines include that the groups typically operate on a cycle system which 
usually lasts a year. Following training from the NGOs (referred to as facilitating 
agencies) on the concepts and functioning of savings groups, the groups begin their 
cycle by making a constitution that clearly lays out guidelines that will govern the 
group. These include guidelines on the number of members that the group will 
have, the leadership positions available and how leaders will be elected, meeting 
schedule and corresponding fines if a member misses a meeting, is late for a 
meeting or do not bring in a minimum amount of savings. This minimum amount 
of savings is often called ‘a share’ and members can bring to a meeting several 
shares up to a maximum agreed beforehand in the constitution of the group. Thus, 
if a share price is set to 20 cents and maximum shares are five a group member can 
bring to a meeting 20, 40, 60, 80 or 1 dollar. These low number examples are 
deliberately chosen as they reflect the reality in many groups. The SG model is a 
financial model reaching the very poor. For transparency purposes, savings group 
activities take place at scheduled meetings. Group funds are kept in a lock box that 
has three locks and the keys are held by three different people for security 
purposes.  
Figure 1 below summarizes the savings group operational model. Savings and 
loans are the core group activities. Members make savings by purchasing shares 
during the scheduled group meetings. These savings are then made available to 
interested members who can take loans from the group funds at a pre-determined 
interest rate. Normally members can only borrow around three times their own 
savings. Thus, collecting savings and giving out loans represents the main 
mechanism through which SGs create value and generate profits for the group 
members. It is, therefore, important that more member savings are converted into 
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loans such that they can fetch a return for the members. Other channels of income 
include penalties for example for not attending or arriving late for group meetings. 
However, these are usually minimal. At the end of the cycle, typically annually, 
the contents of the cash box (the savings plus the accumulated interest) are shared 
out among the group members. By the share-out date all loans must be repaid. 
Hence, operating a SG effectively is not easy. In the beginning of a cycle, members 
must be motivated to bring in sufficient savings to make lending possible. When 
lending begins, the borrowers must be carefully selected in order to assure 
repayment. Fines and interests must be collected, and as the end of a cycle 
approaches all loans must be repaid. It is therefore common to observe that large 
shares of the savings remain in the cash box not only at the beginning and end of 
a cycle but throughout the cycle period. Taken together, a savings group is a 
complex business model to operate and the best proxy to measure whether a group 
is managed effectively and efficiently is the return on savings (ROS). This 
measurement summarizes a group’s ability to intermediate savings and create 
wealth for the group members.  
Figure 1: The operational model of savings groups 
 
 
The first basic savings groups formed in Niger by CARE International under the 
Mata Masu Dubara (Women on the move) project focused on improving women’s 
socioeconomic conditions. Hence, all initial savings groups were comprised of 
only female members. Currently, there are still some facilitating agencies that 
exclusively focus on women. For example: in Sudan, Oxfam’s Saving for Change 




dominated by females, recent developments have witnessed increasing male 
participation. Savings group promoters are encouraging the engagement of men in 
order to mitigate against certain negative effects that may arise when men feel 
threatened by the increasing women empowerment. Such effects include increased 
intimate partner violence (Slegh et al., 2013; Gupta et al., 2013). 
2.2 Relevant literature 
Numerous scholars have investigated the group gender composition-performance 
relationship in different settings albeit with inconclusive results. Some findings 
indicate that more homogenous groups perform better than heterogenous groups 
(see Williams & O'Reilly III, 1998 for a review of work groups). Other studies find 
the contrary, with heterogenous groups outperforming their homogenous 
counterparts (see Orlitzky & Benjamin, 2003 on student groups). Others still find 
no effect of gender composition on the performance of groups (Ely, 2004 on work 
groups).  
In conventional microfinance it is common to apply group lending methodologies. 
In such settings several scholars have investigated the effect of gender composition 
of credit groups. In a laboratory experiment setting of microfinance loan groups, 
Berge, Juniwaty & Sekei (2016) find that female groups are better than all male 
and mixed groups with regards to collaboration for problem solving. Further, they 
find that female groups are more risk taking. Studying loan repayment rates in 
credit groups, Anthony & Horne (2003) find a positive relation between the 
percentage of women and individual loan repayments. Similarly, while 
investigating delinquency rates among microfinance loan groups in Bangladesh, 
Sharma & Zeller (1997) show that delinquency rate decreases as the percentage of 
females in the groups increases. Still, investigating repayment rates, D’Espallier, 
Guérin & Mersland (2011) focus on the microfinance institutions and investigate 
the gender question in terms of the percentage of female clients served by an MFI. 
Their findings suggest that an increase in the percentage of female clients results 
in a decrease in portfolio risk, write-offs, and loan loss provisions. In Guatemala, 
Kevane & Wydick (2001) highlight that female credit groups have the lowest 
instances of fund misuse with mixed gender groups having the worst performance.  
When it comes to gender composition and performance of savings groups Eboh 




and credit associations in Nigeria. He shows that all-female savings and credit 
groups had higher average savings and loans per member compared to all-male 
groups. He further observes that absenteeism from meetings was lower for all-
female savings groups compared to gender mixed groups. Slover (1991) however, 
finds that groups with membership dominated by females have less funds 
mobilized than those comprised of predominantly males. He attributes this to the 
differences in the nature of risk taking between men and women. 
Why would male involvement as group members influence the savings group’s 
profit generating capacity? One argument is that male involvement may increase 
conflicts and tensions in the group due to inherent difference in behavioral 
characteristics between men and women. There is a common perception that unlike 
women, men are less co-operative and less socially oriented (D'Espallier et al., 
2013; Anthony & Horne, 2003). In other words, men are more individualistic 
(Johnson, 2004). Further, literature proposes that men tend to lean more towards 
disagreement and are more competitive while women lean more towards 
agreement and are more conciliatory (Anthony & Horne, 2003). In this paper, I 
argue that such differences may affect group interactions, communication among 
group members, conflict resolution and decision making and consequently 
affecting the group operations.  
Additionally, men have alternative sources of credit and savings (D’Espallier et 
al., 2013). Due to this, they may join savings groups for other purposes and may 
not be interested in the group functions of savings and credit. For instance, women 
sometimes engage in informal financial associations like ROSCAS without the 
knowledge of their husbands and extended family because this is the only way they 
can have control over their money (Guérin, 2011). Men may hence join such 
groups in order to monitor the actions of their wives and get more information 
about their savings and credit activities. This may affect the way women conduct 
their group activities and ultimately have a negative effect on the overall group 
performance. 
With the view that men are poor at loan repayment (Enimu, Eyo, & Ajah, 2017) 
and have lower savings rates (Ledgerwood, 1999), trust issues may arise in the 
groups when men join which may also lead to hesitations in issuing loans to men. 




influenced by social pressure (Johnson, 2004) hence they may default on loan 
repayment without fear of any consequences. 
However, based on some socio-economic characteristics of men especially in the 
areas in which savings groups are prevalent, male engagement may enhance group 
performance in several ways. Men are usually involved in activities that require 
large lumpsums of money and equally have responsibilities that require the same 
(Jonhson, 2004). This may translate into an increased demand for loans which is 
beneficial for a group as a larger share of the savings is lent out. Also, men are 
generally more educated and more literate than women (Guérin, 2011). This could 
bring advantages for the group as they could enhance the knowledge base in the 
group, devise more efficient ways of running the group and growing the group 
fund. After all, as mentioned, operating a SG is complex. Moreover, the argument 
that men are more risk seeking than women (Croson & Gneezy, 2009; Jianakoplos 
& Bernasek, 1998; Slover, 1991) may positively influence the group profit 
generating capacity. If this risk appetite is combined with an increase in interest 
rate to cover the additional risk brought on by men, it may lead to an increase in 
the group returns.  
Does the relationship between gender and savings group profit generating capacity 
vary with the level of gender equality in the different countries where the groups 
are located? One can argue that, indeed, the effect may be different in countries 
where men and women have more equal rights and access to equal opportunities 
compared to countries where there is high inequality between men and women. 
Gender norms inherent in different societies influence the way men and women 
interact in different spheres and have a bearing on the kind of opportunities that 
are available to the different genders (Johnson, 2004). For example, in some 
societies the woman’s responsibilities are relegated only to childbearing and taking 
care of the household (Kabeer, 2005). In such societies, women may not be 
allowed to freely participate in economic activities such as in financial associations 
like savings groups. Moreover, in several cases, even when women can participate 
in certain activities, they are limited from reaching their full potential owing to the 
discriminatory gender norms of such patriarchal cultures (Kinkingninhoun-
Mêdagbé, Diagne, Simtowe, Agboh-Noameshie & Adégbola,2010). When the 




levels of gender inequality, it will likely have a worse effect than in societies where 
gender inequality is low. 
3. Method 
3.1 Variable definitions 
Dependent variables 
The dependent variable, return on savings (ROS), is used to proxy the profit 
generating capacity. Previous studies have used ROS to measure performance of 
SGs (Gonzales Martinez, 2020; Burlando, Canidio & Selby,2016; Burlando & 
Canidio, 2017). ROS captures the profitability of the group and the efficiency with 
which a group manages the complex SG business model to generate profit for its 
members. It measures the value created for the group members when their savings 
are lent out at an interest and it is obtained as the total profit over the average 
savings used to generate these profits. The main avenue through which savings 
groups generate profits is by lending out the collected savings to members who 
require loans (Gonzales Martinez, 2020).  It is not profitable for a savings groups 
to have group savings dormant in the loan fund. The most optimal decision is to 
lend out the group savings so that they can earn an interest that is shared out along 
the member savings at the end of the cycle.  
Independent variable 
The independent variable, group gender composition is captured using two 
variables. One I call male members. This captures the percentage of male members 
in a group and is computed as the number of male members divided by the total 
number of members in the group. The second independent variable I call mixed 
gender which is a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the group is 
composed of both male and female members, and zero if the group is composed of 
only female members. Whereas the dummy variable, mixed gender, covers the 
effect of the mere presence of male members in the group, the male members 






I conjecture that the relation between gender composition and group profit 
generating capacity is influenced by the level of gender equality of the country 
where the group is located. I investigate this by introducing a moderation term for 
gender equality. To measure gender equality, I use the global Gender Gap Index 
(GGI) obtained from the World Economic Forum15. The GGI measures gender-
based differences in relation to four dimensions i.e., economic participation, 
education attainment, health, and political empowerment. The index ranges from 
0 to 1 with higher values meaning higher equality and vice versa. In this study, the 
index has been reverse-coded with higher values meaning higher inequality and 
vice versa for ease of interpretation. 
Control variables 
I include as control variables several SG-specific and contextual variables. The 
SG-specific variables include age of the group, total assets, group size, welfare 
fund, rural dummy, other development initiatives and facilitating agency. Age is 
likely to influence the profit generating capacity of the groups due to the learning 
effect that takes place overtime. With subsequent cycles, members may have a 
better understanding and appreciation of the savings group’s methodology (Moret 
et al., 2020). I also control for total assets which represent the welfare of group 
members, i.e., their ability to bring in more savings to the group. Group size is also 
likely to influence the profit generating capacity as larger groups are likely to have 
higher loan fund utilization rates due to a higher number of projects qualifying for 
loans which should translate into to higher returns. However, a larger group size 
may also expose the group to risks associated with free riding and may affect the 
group operations negatively. Alongside the core loan fund, some SGs keep an 
emergency fund referred to as a welfare fund to cater for member emergencies. 
The welfare fund is likely to influence the group profit generating capacity 
(Gonzales Martinez, 2020). We include a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one if the group keeps a welfare fund and zero otherwise.  
Additionally, I include a dummy variable that takes on the value of one if the group 
is located in the rural areas. The location of the group may influence the profit 
generating capacity of the group because groups in urban areas may have access 






development initiatives are delivered to low-income populations. These other 
development initiatives are usually referred to as “add-ons” or “plus activities”. 
They include health education, financial education, training on income generating 
activities, etc. The presence of add-ons along core group activities is likely to 
influence the SG profit generation capacity as illustrated by Gonzales Martinez 
(2020). I include, as a control variable, a dummy variable that takes on the value 
of one if the group has integrated other development initiatives and zero otherwise. 
SGs are normally formed and supported by international Non-Governmental 
Organizations referred to as facilitating agencies. These facilitating agencies, like 
CARE, World Vision or Aga Khan, usually have different objectives and modes 
of operation which may influence the profit generating of the groups. I take this 
into account by including dummy variables for the different facilitating agencies 
in the sample.  
Savings groups’ profit generating capacity is influenced by macro-economic 
conditions of the countries in which they operate. To account for the different 
macro-economic conditions under which the savings groups in our sample operate, 
I include three contextual control variables. These are the population density, gross 
domestic product (GDP) per capita and the heritage index of economic freedom.  
To minimize the effect of outliers, all the ratios are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels. Table 2 presents all the variables and their definitions. 
3.2 Data 
I have access to a unique dataset on informal grassroot financial associations from 
the Savings Group Information Exchange (SAVIX)16. The SAVIX is an online 
platform that contains standardized data on a large number of savings groups 
globally. It was developed by the VSL Associates and funded by the Bill and 
Melinda Gates Foundation together with several facilitating agencies (CARE 
International, Catholic Relief Services, Oxfam International, and Plan 
International). Data is collected and uploaded to the SAVIX Management 
Information System (MIS) on a quarterly basis. The SAVIX captures several 
elements relating to the operations of the savings groups. It contains data on the 






of 81,853 savings groups from 30 countries. It is an unbalanced dataset that covers 
32 quarters from 2010 to 2017. Table 1 shows the country distribution of the SGs 
in this sample.  
Table 1: Savings groups in the sample by country 
Country Number of SGs  Country Number of SGs 
Mali 16,140 
 
 Niger 1,673 
Uganda 12,158 
 
 Rwanda 1,501 
Burkina Faso 6,155 
 
 Egypt 1,450 
Ghana 5,113 
 
 Ethiopia 1,388 
Ivory Coast 4,730 
 
 Mozambique 1,330 
Kenya 4,723 
 
 Zimbabwe 1,076 
Benin 3,763 
 
 South Africa 1,007 
Tanzania 3,006 
 
 Nigeria 765 
Togo 2,484 
 
 Cameroon 652 
Senegal 2,410 
 
 Madagascar 410 
Sierra Leone 1,961 
 
 Guinea Bissau 314 
Zambia 1,960 
 
 Namibia 131 
Burundi 1,959 
 
 Republic of the Congo 60 
Guinea 1,838 
 
 Swaziland 18 
Malawi 1,673 
 
 Lesotho 5 
   
 Total 81,853 
 
The SAVIX is the first and arguably the most comprehensive database there is on 
informal community managed grassroot associations. Unlike several studies on 
savings groups that are based on case studies of a few selected programs, the 
SAVIX contains global data that makes it possible to do rigorous studies on 
savings groups. The data to the SAVIX is collected and uploaded by field officers 
visiting the groups on a quarterly basis. The SAVIX mainly contains data for 
savings groups that are supported by a facilitating agency, thus it does not cover 
several other groups that are formed spontaneously without the support of a 
facilitating agency which is a weakness of the dataset. Nonetheless, the SAVIX is 
the most representative dataset on savings groups as it covers different 




To supplement data from the SAVIX and consider the macro-economic conditions 
of the countries where the SGs are located, I draw on several country indicators 
obtained from multiple sources. GGI data is obtained from the World Economic 
Forum global gender gap reports, population density is obtained from the world 
development indicators developed by the World Bank 
(https://data.worldbank.org/), Gross Domestic Product(GDP) is obtained from the 
world economic outlook database maintained by the International Monetary Fund 
(https://www.imf.org/en/data) and economic freedom index is obtained from 
heritage foundation (https://www.heritage.org/index/). 
3.3 Estimation strategy 
It should be noted that there could be some endogeneity concerns as the group 
profit generating capacity and the percentage of male members may be 
simultaneously determined. If SGs formed completely or almost completely by 
women are successful for example in terms of producing high returns for group 
members, this will attract men to participate in the next cycle of the SG. Hence, 
the number of men in a group may be influenced by the profit generating capacity 
of a group just as the number of men in a group may influence the profit generating 
capacity. I address this simultaneity bias concern by doing the analysis on only the 
data pertaining to the first cycle of group operations. In such a case, men are not 
basing their decision to join the group on the groups’ previous cycle outcomes. 
I employ random effects regression analysis to investigate whether the profit 
generating capacity is statistically related to the gender composition of the group. 
Specifically, I estimate the basic model below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐𝑖 + 𝑢𝑖𝑡……. (1) 
where 𝑌𝑖𝑡 captures the profit generating capacity, measured in terms of ROS. 
𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑡 is the gender composition of the i
th savings group at time t.  𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents 
a vector of control variables i.e., age of the group, asset size, group size, welfare 
fund, rural dummy, facilitating agency, other development initiatives, population 
density, gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and the heritage index of 
economic freedom. I also include time dummies in the different regressions to 
cater for time fixed effects. 𝑐𝑖 is the group specific unobserved effect and 𝑢𝑖𝑡 is the 




3.4 Gender composition of SGs over time 
Although over 80 percent of savings groups’ membership globally is comprised of 
women (Wheaton, 2019), figure 2 shows that the share of male members is 
growing rapidly over time. Male members have increased from around 9 percent 
in 2010 to over 27 percent in 2017. This shows the increasing significance of men 
in savings groups’ operations. 
Figure 2: Share of male members in savings groups over time. 
 
3.5 Summary statistics 
Table 2 presents the summary statistics for the variables used in the study. From 
the table, we see that the average group in the dataset is composed of 17 percent 
male members. The mixed gender dummy shows that about 55 percent of the 
groups have both male and female members. The other 45 percent is composed of 
only female members. 
With regards to the profit generating capacity, the average group has a return on 
savings of 40.9 percent.  The return on savings captures the profitability of the 




of 40.9 percent means that at each end-of-cycle share-out, each member on average 
makes 40 cents on each dollar saved. This further shows that savings groups 
typically lend out to high rates and fetch higher returns for group members as 
compared to other savings mechanisms like the formal financial institutions 
(Allen, 2002) 
Regarding the moderating variable, global gender gap index, the average group is 
located in a country with a score of 0.65 which indicates that most groups are 
located in countries with moderate levels of gender equality. The minimum value 
(0.57) and maximum value (0.82) show that SGs in the sample are located in 
countries with diverse levels of gender equality i.e., from average levels to high 
levels of equality. 
Moving on to the savings groups’ characteristics, we observe that the average 
group has been in existence for 351 days (corresponding to about one year since 
its first savings were initiated for the first cycle), has an asset size of 667.6 USD 
and has 23 active members. Further still, 69.5 percent of the SGs keep a welfare 
fund and 59 percent are in the rural areas. A welfare fund is an emergency pot that 
group members draw on when faced with emergencies. 37.6 percent of the SGs 
incorporate other development initiatives like health education, women 
empowerment etc. along the core savings group activities of saving and borrowing. 
This shows that savings groups, in addition to being mechanisms for local 
intermediation of savings, are also channels through which multiple services can 
be offered to the people at the bottom of the pyramid to tackle multi-dimensional 
poverty. The table further shows that the majority of the SGs in the sample (29.3 
percent) are supported by Plan International, closely followed by CARE (24.2 
percent), Oxfam (19 percent) and Catholic Relief Services (14.4 percent) with the 
other facilitating agencies sharing the remaining 13 percent among them. 
Looking at the macro economic conditions for the countries in our sample, the 
average country has a population density of 108.43 people per square kilometer, 







Table 2: Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
Variable Definition Obs. Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Gender variables       
Male members Proportion of male members in the group 227,388 0.170 0.067 0.210 0 0.968 
Mixed gender 
A dummy variable equal to 1 if the group is composed of 
both males and females and 0 if the group is composed of 
only females 
227,388 0.550 1 0.497 0 1 
Profit generating capacity      
ROS Return on savings 227,388 0.409 0.275 0.466 -0.339 2.212 
Gender equality indicator 
GGI 
Global gender gap index of the country in which the group 
is located 
211,513 0.653 0.650 0.061 0.568 0.822 
SG characteristics        
Age The age of the group in days 227,388 350.736 256 336.736 14 1756 
Total Assets The total assets of the group 227,388 667.558 366.591 809.380 4.096 4399.131 
Asset size The natural logarithm of total assets 227,388 5.802 5.904 1.336 1.410 8.389 
Group size The number of active members in the group 227,388 23.174 25 6.054 3 100 
Welfare fund 1 if the group keeps an emergency fund 227,388 0.695 1 0.460 0 1 
Rural 1 if the group is in the rural areas 227,388 0.591 1 0.492 0 1 
Other development 
initiatives 
1 if the group has integrated other development initiatives 227,388 0.376 0 0.484 0 1 
Facilitating agency       
CARE 1 if the group is supported by CARE 227,388 0.242 0 0.428 0 1 
Catholic Relief 
Services 
1 if the group is supported by Catholic Relief Services 227,388 0.144 0 0.351 0 1 
Oxfam 1 if the group is supported by Oxfam 227,388 0.190 0 0.393 0 1 
Plan International 1 if the group is supported by Plan International 227,388 0.293 0 0.455 0 1 
Others 
1 if the group is supported by other facilitating agencies 
other than those indicated above 
227,388 0.130 0 0.336 0 1 
Macro indicator       
Population density People per square km of land area 227,388 108.427 76.847 102.454 2.761 485.648 
GDP per capita GDP per capita of the country in which the group is located 227,388 2531.638 1959.434 1977.522 669.694 12533.94 




4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Gender and savings groups’ profit generating capacity 
Table 3 presents the random effects regression results for the effect of gender on 
the profit generating capacity of the group measured in terms of the return on 
savings (ROS). The results reported in column 1 indicate that the proportion of 
male members is negatively related to the profit generating capacity of the group. 
This means that a group with a higher proportion of male members exhibits lower 
return on savings. The estimated co-efficient shows that a unit increase in the 
proportion of male members by say a 100 percentage points leads to a 6.7 
percentage point decrease in the ROS.  
One potential argument for the observed effect is the perception that men are poor 
at loan repayment and hence have higher default rates than women (D’Espallier et 
al., 2011; Mutebi et al., 2017). The high default rates have a direct effect on the 
returns on savings as both the member savings and interest income are lost. 
Moreover, the potentially higher default rates could have an effect on the fund 
utilization rate if loans to men are rationed to mitigate the effects of their poor 
repayment rates. In groups composed of both men and women, women may tend 
to limit the amount of money that they allow men to take as loans and also reduce 
the overall lending in a group. A similar observation was made by Mutebi et al. 
(2017) where in some mixed gender groups, there was a limit to how many men 
were allowed in the group owing to the high default rates of men. Additionally, 
there were more stringent terms imposed when men required loans for example, 
they required that men have their spouses serve as their guarantors because women 
ensured that men fully paid back the acquired loan (Mutebi et al., 2017).   
Another potential argument is that the nature of savings groups may not be suited 
to the socio-economic characteristics of men i.e., they more often require bigger 
loans that the group may not be able to offer. Johnson (2004) makes a similar 
observation with regards to ROSCAs being less suited to men’s financial 
responsibilities. Moreover, since men usually have alternative forms of savings 
and sources of credit unlike women, they may not care much for the savings 
group’s activities and may join for different purposes. Some men may join to 
monitor the activities of the women (Waller, 2014). In such instances, this may 




the men to have knowledge of the same. For example, women may reduce how 
much they borrow because they do not want the men to know how much money 
they have under their control. Anderson & Baland (2002) observe that women keep 
their participation in informal savings groups secret from their husbands to hide 
their savings from misuse by the husbands so when men join such groups, it could 
infringe on the privacy that the women sought and influence their savings and 
borrowing behavior ultimately affecting the return on savings. 
Table 3: Gender and SG profit generation capacity 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ROS ROS 
Male members -0.0670***  
 (0.0061)  
Mixed gender  -0.0397*** 
  (0.0030) 
Age 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Asset size 0.1562*** 0.1569*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) 
Group size -0.0093*** -0.0089*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) 
Other development initiatives -0.0412*** -0.0416*** 
 (0.0038) (0.0038) 
Welfare fund -0.0989*** -0.0966*** 
 (0.0032) (0.0032) 
Rural -0.0105*** -0.0105*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) 
Population density 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
GDP per capita -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 
 (0.0000) (0.0000) 
Heritage -0.0077*** -0.0079*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Constant 0.3590*** 0.3699*** 
 (0.0275) (0.0276) 
   
Agency dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 227,388 227,388 
R-squared 0.2024 0.2026 
Number of SGs 81,853 81,853 
Table 3 shows the random effects regression results for the relationship between gender and SG profit 
generating capacity (measured by return on savings). Refer to table 2 for the definition of the variables. 






Taking a look at the control variables, some results are interesting. I observe a 
lower ROS for rural groups which hints to the poorer investment opportunities in 
rural areas hence the need to lend to members at lower interest rates or a lower 
share of the savings being converted into loans. Similarly, we observe that a lower 
return on savings is associated with SGs that deliver other development initiatives 
along the core group activities. This indicates that the other development initiatives 
may destruct the group from the core savings and borrowing activities, an area that 
should be researched further to find out how delivery of other initiatives influences 
savings groups operations and devise ways of constructively doing the same 
without harming the core group model. Further still, lower profit generating 
capacity is associated with groups that keep a welfare fund for emergency 
purposes. We also observe that SGs with a larger asset size exhibit a higher profit 
generating capacity. 
In column 2, gender composition is measured using the dummy variable, mixed 
gender. The results are consistent with those obtained when gender is measured 
using the proportion of male members. There is a negative relation between the 
mixed gender dummy and the profit generating capacity of the group. Specifically, 
mixed gender savings groups have significantly lower ROS than savings groups 
composed of only female members.  
4.2 Moderating effect of gender equality 
Does the above relation between gender composition and group profit generating 
capacity vary with the level of gender equality of the country in which the group 
is located? To answer this, I include an interaction term between gender 
composition and the level of gender equality in the regression model. Gender 
equality is measured using the global gender gap index (GGI). Random effects 
regression results are presented in table 4. As in Table 3 column 1 reports numbers 
related to the share of male members while column 2 reports results when gender 
is measured using the mixed gender dummy variable. 
As shown, contextual gender equality influences the effect of gender on group 
profit generating capacity. Specifically, the negative relation between gender and 
the ROS is worse as the level of gender inequality increases. The results shed light 





Table 4: Moderating role of gender equality 
 (1) (2) 
Variables ROS ROS 
Male members -0.0886***  
 (0.0072)  
GGI 0.1144*** 0.1909*** 
 (0.0177) (0.0217) 
Mixed  -0.0403*** 
  (0.0033) 
Male members*GGI -0.4838***  
 (0.0563)  
Mixed*GGI  -0.2789*** 
  (0.0267) 
   
Control variables Yes Yes 
Agency dummies Yes Yes 
Time dummies Yes Yes 
   
Observations 211,513 211,513 
R-squared 0.2127 0.2129 
Number of SGs17 75,361 75,361 
Table 4 shows the results for the moderating effect of gender equality (measured by the gender gap index, 
GGI) on relationship between gender and SG profit generating capacity (measured by return on savings). 
Refer to table 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** 
represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
4.3 Further analyses 
I conduct a few other tests to ascertain the robustness of the results.  
Alternative estimation method: To ascertain the robustness of the results and make 
an argument for a causal effect of gender composition on group profit generating 
capacity, I employ the difference-in-differences (DID) approach (Chen, Leung & 
Goergen, 2017). DID is used to estimate the effect of a treatment by comparing 
two similar groups, one with treatment and the other without treatment.  
The SAVIX dataset contains data that is collected on a quarterly basis. To form 
the sample for this analysis, I include groups that experience an increase in group 
membership. I include data on the group one quarter before and one quarter after 
the increase in group membership. To make the treatment group, the increase in 
group membership had to bring in male members hence the group moved from 
 
17 Information on GGI is missing for some countries reducing the number of SGs used in this analysis as 




being all-female to mixed. This leaves 203 SGs making up the treatment group. In 
the control group, the increase in group membership still brings in female members 
and the group remains all-female. This leaves 1745 SGs making the control group. 
Before performing the DID, I apply propensity score matching on the pre-
treatment data to make the treatment and control groups as similar as possible. I 
use the nearest neighbor to select (Stuart & Rubin, 2008), for each SG in the 
treatment group an SG from the control group with the closest propensity score 
basing on several matching covariates. Specifically, each SG with mixed gender 
composition is matched to an SG with only female members that is as similar as 
possible to it along several covariates before male members joined the mixed SG. 
The control variables used in the previous regression models form the matching 
covariates that are adopted. The final dataset after matching contains data on 203 
treated SGs and an equal number of matched control SGs. 
To test the reliability of the matching, I conduct univariate t-tests for the matching 
covariates to compare the mixed gender groups with their matched control SGs. 
Panel A of Table 5 shows that there is no statistically significant difference 
between both groups along the observable matching covariates. I then estimate the 
DID model below on the matched sample. 
𝑅𝑂𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
 𝛿𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡……. (2) 
Where 𝑀𝑎𝑙𝑒 𝑗𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑠 is an indicator variable equal to one if the SG is in the 
treatment group, and zero otherwise, 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 is an indicator variable equal to one if 
the quarter is after membership increase. 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represents a vector of control 
variables as in equation 1. I include cycle, facilitating agency and time fixed 
effects. SGs may be in different cycles which could influence profit generating 
capacity so cycle fixed effects take this into account. 
Panel B of table 5 presents the DID results. The coefficient on the 
Male joiners × Post is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level which 
suggests that after male members joining the group, SGs have lower ROS than 
after female members join. The coefficient shows that SGs have ROS that is 10 





Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimation results 
Panel A: Matching reliability    
 Treatment Control t-stat 
Age 247.059 212.493 -1.443 
Total Assets 511.757 407.918 -1.534 
Group size 17.828 17.872 0.083 
SG plus 0.103 0.089 -0.504 
Welfare fund 0.847 0.837 -0.272 
Rural 0.286 0.256 -0.669 
Population density 93.854 86.080 -1.302 
GDP per capita 2911.756 2967.337 0.323 
Heritage 57.467 57.449 -0.075 
    
Panel B: Difference-in-differences 
results    
  ROS  
Male joiners 0.0367  
  (0.0385)  
Post  0.0232  
  (0.0418)  
Male joiners*Post     -0.1019** 
  (0.0463)  
    
Control variables Yes  
Agency dummies Yes  
Cycle dummies Yes  
Time dummies Yes  
    
Observations 812  
R-square  0.3527  
Number of SGs 406  
Panel A shows the univariate t-tests results comparing the treated and matched control groups. Panel B 
shows the DID results for the relationship between gender and SG profit generating capacity (measured 
by return on savings). Refer to table 2 for the definition of the variables. Robust standard errors in 
parentheses. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Alternative definition of the gender variable: I recode the gender variable into four 
categories to assess if the manner of the composition has any effect on the profit 
generating capacity. The categories are; all female (takes the value of 1 if all 
members in the group are female and zero otherwise), minority men (assumes the 
value of 1 if the group is composed of less men than women and zero otherwise), 




men and women, and zero otherwise) and majority men (assumes the value of 1 if 
the group is composed of more men than women and zero otherwise).  
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 6 and the “all female” is the 
reference category. Compared to groups that are composed of only female 
members, groups that have some men in them, have a lower ROS further 
confirming the previous results. This is evidenced by the negative significant 
results on all categories i.e., minority men, balanced and majority men. In fact, the 
coefficient for majority being men is the highest, illustrating again that the more 
‘male’ a group becomes the worse the group performs.  
Table 6: Robustness analysis - redefined gender categorization 
Variables ROS 




Majority men -0.0445*** 
 (0.0046) 
  
Control variables Yes 
Agency dummies Yes 







Number of SGs 81,853 
Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
5. Conclusion 
While there are increasing efforts to engage men in gender-focused development 
projects, little is known about how this influences the effectiveness of the projects. 
This is particularly true for savings groups which have become a ‘darling’ for 
development agencies which are interested in financial inclusion and 
empowerment through group efforts for people living at the bottom of the pyramid. 




profit generating capacity of savings groups, i.e., the effectiveness of groups. I 
further probe whether this relationship is moderated by the gender equality 
situation in the country where the savings groups are located.  Gender composition 
is measured through the proportion of male members, and a dummy variable that 
shows whether the group is composed of both male and female members or only 
female members. Profit generating capacity is measured through the return on 
savings which measures the wealth created from member savings. Using a large 
sample of data pertaining to 81,853 savings groups in 30 countries, I employ 
random effects regression analysis to investigate the effects of gender composition 
on SG profit generating capacity. I address endogeneity concerns due to 
simultaneity bias by doing the empirical analysis on observations from only the 
first cycle of group operations, i.e., the gender composition of the group is decided 
ex-ante the performance of the group.  
Results indicate that there is a negative relationship between gender composition 
and group profit generating capacity suggesting that SGs with a higher proportion 
of male members have a lower return on savings. The results for the dummy 
variable for mixed gender group are consistent showing that SGs with both male 
and female members have a lower return on savings as compared to those that have 
only female members. Further, results for the interaction term between the gender 
composition and gender equality variable show that the negative relationship 
between gender composition and profit generating capacity is generally made 
worse in contexts with high gender inequality. These findings are robust to 
alternative estimation methods and alternative definitions of the gender 
composition variable. Results from the differences-in-differences robustness 
estimation further minimize endogeneity concerns. 
A couple of recommendations emerge from the study. First, to avoid harming the 
savings group operational model, practitioners should be aware of the downsides 
that come with male engagement in SGs and should derive ways of solving such 
downsides. Male engagement can be an important component in the empowerment 
of women. However, as seen from the results, having both males and females in 
the same group has a negative effect on some core aspects of the savings group 
model. Thus, SG promoters should be wary about this and come up with necessary 
balancing efforts like for instance gender awareness training and increased 




Second, development actors should exercise increased contextual caution when 
implementing programs. Underlying gender norms of the different program areas 
should be taken into consideration before implementing uniform programs in 
different areas. This recommendation stems from the observation that the negative 
relationship between gender composition and SG profit generating capacity varies 
with the gender equality of the different countries in which the SGs are located.  
Savings groups are often used by development actors to deliver other development 
initiatives apart from savings and credit. Gender equality dialogue and training is 
one such initiative that is often delivered through these groups. Further research 
can show how the effect of gender on group operations is moderated by gender 
equality training as an add-on. Could such trainings provide a potential solution to 
the observed negative effect that mixed gender groups have a lower ROS than 
groups that are all females? 
Future studies are also needed to capture the effect on women which cannot be 
captured by the current quantitative investigation. Are women changing their 
behavior for example in terms of expression during group meetings when men join 
the groups? The lower ROS for mixed gender groups could signal a change in 
saving and borrowing behavior among female members when men join the groups. 
Understanding how women react to men joining the groups will expose the 
behavioral biases that women may have towards men and with this, solutions can 
be devised on how the two genders can collaborate for the overall good of the 
group and individuals in the group.  
Moreover, on a more general level, a qualitative investigation may help decipher 
the reasons why men join SGs and particularly why they would like to be in the 
same group as women. Do they trust dealing with women more than fellow men? 
Do they join such groups to monitor activities of the women as suggested by 
Waller (2014) and have an idea of the financial position of the women? As gender 
norms paint women as a generally weaker gender in societies with high gender 
inequality, do the men join female groups to take advantage of the position of 
women? Do they join such SGs because they are lured by the development 
agencies, who are interested in driving the gender equality agenda, and are not 
interested in the group activities? Are development agencies more interested in the 
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